John Charles Jones v Roderic Alexander Innes Hamilton

Contempt of court requires proof to the criminal standard that the respondent knew of the order, deliberately performed or omitted the relevant act, and thereby breached a clear requirement. The respondent need not know that the conduct amounted to a breach. Court orders and undertakings must be obeyed even where compliance is burdensome or contractual obligations point in another direction; the proper course is to seek variation. Where impossibility is raised, the applicant must prove that compliance was possible once an evidential basis for impossibility has been established. The court may assess the cumulative effect of explanations when deciding whether conduct is deliberate and dishonest. A false statement of truth requires falsity, absence of honest belief, and a likelihood of material interference with the course of justice.

The trustees in bankruptcy of Roderic Hamilton continued an application originally brought against John Jones for contempt of court. The allegations concerned breaches of freezing orders, an undertaking to the court, failures to provide information, alleged false affidavits of assets, a Part 18 Response, and dealings with assets and expenditure.

The application had a lengthy procedural history, including amendments, disclosure directions and adjournments. After a six-day hearing, the central questions were whether the alleged acts or omissions breached the relevant orders or undertaking, whether Jones had the necessary mental element, and whether the allegations were proved to the criminal standard.

1. Applicable principles. The criminal standard applies to civil contempt. The applicant must prove that the respondent knew of the order, knew what act or omission he was performing, and deliberately performed or omitted it. Knowledge that the conduct constituted a breach is unnecessary. The terms of an order or undertaking must be clear and unambiguous, and must be obeyed unless varied or set aside.
2. Impossibility. Where the respondent adduces some evidence that compliance was impossible, the applicant must prove beyond reasonable doubt that compliance was possible. Contractual obligations, company-law concerns or the possibility that another person could have authorised a payment did not excuse Jones from complying with the freezing order.
3. Findings on the frozen funds. The entirety of the €1.972 million paid into Andromeda’s account constituted frozen funds. Jones’ payments to Verdoso and to himself breached the 2017 Order. His investment of €450,000 in the Black Falcon diamond was also a serious breach. The alleged breaches concerning payments to Deltan and Verdoso from the SGI escrow account were not established because Jones lacked power to countermand the relevant instructions without Mr Ullmann’s approval.
4. Other breaches. Contempt was established in relation to the omission of the Rector Jaume property from the first affidavit of assets, the contractual addendum increasing payments by Walton Castle Events Ltd, the failure to notify the source of funds used from the Sabadell account, and the continuing failure to notify the source of funds used for expenditure from the UK accounts. A breach concerning information about legal-fee payments was not contempt because the order was ambiguous and Jones’ explanation was accepted.
5. The allegations concerning dissipation of personal chattels, the Part 18 Response, the Tranche 2 undertaking, GFC shares, and transfers between Barclays accounts were not established as contempt. Jones was found in contempt on Grounds 2–4, Ground 8 concerning Rector Jaume, Ground 10, Ground 12 and Ground 15. The appropriate sanction was adjourned to a further hearing.

First-instance committal decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.