Manchester City Council v CP & Ors

Restrictions on a child’s mobile phone, tablet, laptop or social-media access do not ordinarily constitute a deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1) of the ECHR. Article 5 protects physical liberty, not every restriction on communication or personal autonomy.

Such restrictions should generally be managed under the local authority’s parental responsibility under section 33(3)(b) of the Children Act 1989, where necessary to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare. Court authorisation under the inherent jurisdiction may be available for physical restraint or force, but only where the statutory threshold of likely significant harm is met. A deprivation-of-liberty order must not be used to authorise measures engaging Article 8 without applying the separate Article 8(2) safeguards.

A local authority sought renewal of an order authorising the deprivation of a 16-year-old child’s liberty in a placement. It also sought authority for extensive restrictions on her mobile phone, tablet, laptop and access to social media, including confiscation, monitoring, supervised calls and restrictions on Wi-Fi.

The child was subject to a care order and had complex emotional difficulties, serious self-harming behaviour and risks associated with unsafe online contact. The central questions were whether the device restrictions formed part of a deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1), whether they could instead be imposed under section 33(3)(b) of the Children Act 1989, and whether the inherent jurisdiction could authorise restraint to enforce them.

1. Article 5 and device restrictions. The court refused to authorise the restrictions on P’s mobile phone, tablet, laptop and social-media access as part of a deprivation-of-liberty order. Article 5(1) concerns physical liberty. The relevant question is whether the measures constitute an objective component of confinement in a particular restricted place for a not negligible period.
2. The restrictions primarily limited communication and online contact in order to protect P from harm. They did not themselves confine her, and the evidence did not show that they were necessary to make effective the measures preventing her from leaving the placement. They therefore did not satisfy the first Storck criterion, whether considered individually, cumulatively or as part of the wider regime.
3. Although the other restrictions—continuous supervision, control, restraint, observation, escort and limits on movement—did constitute a deprivation of liberty, the court warned against treating every measure within a care package as part of that deprivation. Article 5 authorisation must remain confined to measures affecting physical liberty.
4. Parental responsibility. Regulation and supervision of a child’s use of electronic devices fall within parental responsibility. Under section 33(3)(b) of the Children Act 1989, a local authority may confiscate or restrict a device, refuse top-ups or payment, and restrict Wi-Fi where necessary to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare, including in the face of objection by a 16-year-old child. Such measures may also engage Article 8, but must be necessary and proportionate under Article 8(2).
5. Restraint and inherent jurisdiction. Physical restraint or force to remove a device would be a grave step requiring court sanction. The court could grant permission to invoke the inherent jurisdiction for that purpose where continued device use caused or risked significant harm and only the minimum force was required. Section 100(4)(b) was not satisfied on the evidence because P had largely co-operated and the local authority could act under section 33(3)(b). No anticipatory order was justified.
6. The court authorised the remaining deprivation-of-liberty restrictions as being in P’s best interests, necessary and proportionate. It declared the device restrictions lawful under section 33(3)(b), rather than under Article 5.