University of Brighton v Persons Unknow Occupying Land

A final quia timet injunction may restrain future trespass where there is a sufficiently real and imminent risk of repetition. The absence of an express intention to return is not determinative. The court must consider the six principles in Joseph Boyd v Ineos Upstream Ltd, including notice, precision, and geographical and temporal limits, together with whether the likely harm would be so grave and irreparable that damages would be inadequate. The injunction must correspond to the threatened tort and should avoid intention-based wording where the prohibited conduct can be described in ordinary language. Its duration must be proportionate to the continuing risk.

The claimant, a university and freehold owner, obtained an interim injunction requiring persons unknown occupying part of its building to vacate. The occupants had entered offices, barricaded themselves inside, accessed the roof and protested against possible staff redundancies. They vacated before enforcement of the interim order, and the claimant recovered possession.

At the return hearing no defendant appeared. The claimant amended its claim to seek a final injunction preventing renewed occupation for one year. The issues were whether a possession order remained necessary and whether a proportionate final quia timet injunction should be granted.

1. Possession. A possession order was unnecessary because the claimant had recovered possession through the interim injunction. The essence of an order for possession is restoring the claimant to possession. The court therefore did not determine the potential Convention Articles 10 and 11 arguments, which were not advanced at the final hearing.
2. Risk of repetition. Applying the first principle in Joseph Boyd v Ineos Upstream Ltd, the court held that there was a sufficiently real and imminent risk of renewed occupation. The continuing dispute about redundancies, the recent occupation and the occupants’ refusal to comply promptly with the interim injunction were important factors. An expressly stated intention to return was unnecessary.
3. Six principles and harm. The remaining Ineos principles were satisfied: the likely tortfeasors could not be individually named; effective notice was possible; the injunction corresponded to the threatened trespass; its terms were clear; and the premises were geographically defined. Following Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown, the court removed the reference to protesting purpose because barricading and refusing to vacate sufficiently described the prohibited conduct in ordinary language.
4. The court held that the Ineos framework must be supplemented by a seventh requirement, derived from Bromley London Borough Council v Persons Unknown and Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown: whether the resulting harm would be so grave and irreparable that damages would be inadequate despite an immediate injunction. Health and safety risks, irrecoverable repair and administrative costs, and possible reputational and financial harm satisfied that requirement.
5. A final injunction was granted, modified to prohibit occupation for six months rather than one year. The claimant could return to court if a real and imminent risk remained thereafter.