Senel Ahmet v David Tatum & Anor

Where a restraint order or confiscation proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 engage disputed beneficial interests in property, those interests should be determined through the statutory process in the Crown Court. A third party’s ability to bring civil proceedings in the Chancery Division does not justify parallel proceedings seeking to determine the same issue. Such proceedings may constitute an abuse of process, even where the claimant has not previously obtained a determination of the proprietary issue. The statutory scheme provides adequate opportunities to assert and protect third-party interests, including at confiscation and enforcement stages, with rights of appeal.

Senel Ahmet claimed a beneficial interest in a property registered in the sole name of David Tatum, her partner. Tatum had pleaded guilty to serious drug and conspiracy offences and had been sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The property was subject to a restraint order made under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and confiscation proceedings were pending in the Crown Court.

Ahmet issued Part 8 proceedings in the Chancery Division against Tatum and the Crown Prosecution Service, seeking determination of her proprietary interest. The CPS applied to strike out the claim as an abuse of process, contending that Parliament had provided a complete statutory scheme for resolving such disputes in the Crown Court. The central issue was whether the Chancery proceedings improperly circumvented that scheme.

1. Claim struck out. The proceedings were an abuse of process because they sought to determine in the Chancery Division the same beneficial-interest issues which Parliament had assigned to the statutory confiscation process in the Crown Court.
2. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 provides a complete and exhaustive scheme for disputed property interests arising in the context of restraint and confiscation orders. Under section 10A, the Crown Court may determine the extent of the defendant’s interest in property likely to be realised to satisfy a confiscation order. The word “may” gives the Crown Court discretion as to when to determine the issue, rather than preserving a parallel jurisdiction in the High Court.
3. Third parties are adequately protected. They may make representations concerning their interests, have those interests determined on the balance of probabilities, and appeal where the Act permits. They may also raise relevant issues at restraint-order variation proceedings or at the enforcement stage, including before an enforcement receiver.
4. Section 58(5) does not authorise a claimant unilaterally to commence parallel Chancery proceedings after a restraint order. Its provision for another court to stay or continue proceedings, after hearing the CPS or receiver, assumes the primacy of the Crown Court process.
5. Capper v Chaney & Anor [2010] EWHC 1704, applying Autologic Holdings Plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2006] 1 AC 118, established that proceedings seeking substantially the same relief through a court or tribunal other than that designated by Parliament may be abusive. The principle was not confined to cash or to cases involving a previous failed determination. Re Norris [2002] 1 WLR 188 was distinguishable because the predecessor legislation assigned the relevant jurisdiction to the High Court. R v Forte & Anor [2020] EWCA Crim 1455 and the postscript in Serious Fraud Office v Lexi Holdings plc [2009] QB 376 did not support unilateral parallel proceedings; any separate Chancery determination would depend on the Crown Court’s direction.