Leeds City Council v Persons Unknown

Part 4 Chapter 3 Closure Orders under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 concern objectively identifiable premises, not an area, locality or any line drawn on a map. Premises may be open land or a place, but must be a distinctive property or distinctive part of a property. A public highway is not premises for this purpose.

The statutory power permits closure with specified exceptions concerning persons, times or circumstances. It does not permit an order whose substance is merely to prohibit a specified activity or category of person. That form of targeted prohibition is available for Public Spaces Protection Orders, but not Closure Orders. The appeal was dismissed because both the identified areas and the proposed car-cruising prohibitions fell outside the statutory power.

The Council appealed by way of case stated against Leeds Magistrates Court’s refusal to extend three Closure Orders made under Part 4 Chapter 3 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The Orders concerned mapped exclusion zones including streets, public highways, commercial areas and a retail park. They prohibited entry by persons participating in car cruising or car-meet events.

The magistrates concluded that the areas were not “particular premises” and that the Orders did not lawfully specify permitted access. The questions for the High Court were whether the mapped areas could constitute premises under section 92(1), and whether section 80(7) permitted the proposed activity-based prohibitions.

1. Appeal dismissed. The magistrates had made no material error of law. Each of the two identified defects was independently fatal to the proposed extensions.
2. The distinction between interpretation and application was important. Interpretation identifies the objectively correct statutory meaning. Application involves a procedurally fair and substantively reasonable evaluative judgment by the primary decision-maker. The question whether facts fit statutory language is not invariably a hard-edged question of law.
3. For Part 4 Chapter 3, “premises” under section 92(1) means an objectively identifiable distinctive property or distinctive part of a property in the real world and on the ground. It may be a building, structure, part of one, open or enclosed land, or a place such as an open private car park. It need not be adjacent to a building. It cannot be merely an area, locality or arbitrary mapped zone. A highway is not premises for this purpose.
4. This construction was supported by the statutory scheme, the use of “particular premises”, the distinction between premises and areas or localities elsewhere in the Act, the practical consequences of criminalising entry, and the contrasting provisions governing Public Spaces Protection Orders. The availability of a PSPO did not impose a general “closest fit” requirement, but it was a legitimate contextual aid in identifying the scope of the Closure Order power.
5. Section 80(7) permits an “all-except-this” prohibition on access by persons, at times or in circumstances, with specified exceptions. It does not permit an order which, in substance, prohibits only a specified activity or specified category of person. The court must apply an “acid test”: if the supposed exception itself has to be expressed as an “all-except-this” exception, the order is really an impermissible “only-this” prohibition.
6. The proposed Orders, framed to prohibit access when participating in car cruising or car-meet events, were therefore outside section 80(7). The Court’s answers to both questions were yes, and the appeal was dismissed.

The judgment was a case stated appeal from Leeds Magistrates Court’s ruling dated 26 April 2022, which refused extensions of three Closure Orders. The High Court dismissed the appeal.