Huawei Technologies (UK) Limited & Anor v DSV Solutions Limited

Article 31.2 of the CMR Convention prevents new proceedings in another competent contracting state where the first court has determined the parties’ rights arising from the carriage. A decision that a claim is time-barred is a judgment capable of being given effect for this purpose. Claims arising from loss of or damage to goods carried under the Convention are subject to its limitations whether framed in contract or tort. Different legal terminology does not avoid the requirement that proceedings concern the same grounds. The general six-year period in the Limitation Act 1980 does not displace the specific one-year period implemented by the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965.

The claim concerned approximately 300 mobile phones transported by DSV Solutions Limited from England to the Netherlands for Huawei Technologies (UK) Limited. China Pacific Property Insurance Co Ltd was the insurer. The phones were missing on delivery.

Proceedings were first issued in the Netherlands, where the court held that the claim was time-barred under the CMR Convention and refused a declaration of non-liability. The claimants subsequently brought proceedings in England, advancing possible contractual and tortious claims. DSV applied for strike-out or summary judgment, relying on the Netherlands Decision and the CMR Convention.

The central issues were whether the Netherlands Decision was a judgment enforceable for the purposes of Article 31.2, whether the English claim was brought on the same grounds, and whether the Convention precluded contractual or tortious claims.

1. Summary judgment granted. The claimants had no realistic prospect of success and there was no compelling reason for trial. DSV was entitled to summary judgment.
2. Article 31.2 of the CMR Convention was interpreted broadly, consistently with its international character. The Netherlands courts were competent under Article 31.1. Their decision that the claim was time-barred was a judgment capable of being given effect and therefore an enforceable judgment for Article 31.2 purposes.
3. The word enforceable was not confined to judgments ordering substantive payment or other coercive relief. Article 31.3 supported the conclusion that recognition of a judgment, without reopening its merits, was sufficient. Article 32.2 also contemplated that limitation would be determined by the court first seised of the case.
4. The English proceedings were on the same grounds as the Netherlands proceedings. Claims arising from the same loss of goods had the same fundamental legal basis, even if expressed as a declaration claim in one jurisdiction and a damages claim in another, or described using different legal terminology.
5. The Convention also governed claims in tort arising from loss of or damage to goods carried under it. Article 28 expressly permitted the carrier to rely on Convention provisions limiting or excluding liability for extra-contractual claims. The distinction between an extinguishing provision and a remedy bar did not assist the claimants because Article 31 precluded proceedings in England.
6. Alternatively, the specific one-year limitation period under the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965 was not displaced by the general six-year period under the Limitation Act 1980. The two enactments were not inconsistent, and the 1965 Act was not repealed or amended in that respect.