Christopher Richard Lattimer v Maria Karamanoli

Summary judgment is inappropriate where the evidence gives a defendant a real prospect of establishing an interpretation or rectification case requiring cross-examination at trial. A will may be ambiguous on its face or in the light of surrounding circumstances. The court may interpret a will to give effect to the testator’s intention, including by supplying or rearranging words where the intended meaning is clear. Rectification remains subject to the statutory limits in the Administration of Justice Act 1982. A marriage is capable of revoking a will even if it is later annulled, unless a statutory exception applies. The court cannot create a general public-policy exception to the statutory operation of section 18 of the Wills Act 1837.

The claimant, the deceased’s husband, sought summary judgment for declarations that the deceased’s will had been revoked by their marriage, that the marriage was valid and subsisting at death, and that he was entitled to letters of administration. He also sought reverse summary judgment and strike-out of the defendant’s rectification counterclaim.

The defendant sought permission to amend her defence and counterclaim. She alleged that the will was made in contemplation of marriage, or should be rectified to achieve that result or to limit its scope to the English estate. She also challenged the marriage’s validity and relied on public policy and ex turpi causa. The central issues were whether the proposed defences and counterclaims had a real prospect of success and whether there was any compelling reason for trial.

1. Summary judgment and amendment. The applicable question under CPR 24.2 was whether the defendant had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim and whether there was any other compelling reason for trial. The court assessed the evidence, not merely the pleadings. The proposed interpretation and rectification cases required factual investigation and cross-examination, so they had a real prospect of success.
2. Interpretation of the will. The expression “my last and only will” was capable of ambiguity. “Last” could mean most recent or could indicate that no later will was intended. The surrounding circumstances also gave the defendant a real prospect of showing that the deceased intended the will to survive the forthcoming marriage. The court could, if that intention were proved, interpret the will by supplying words such as an expression that the will was made in contemplation of marriage.
3. Rectification. The defendant had a real prospect of proving that the will failed to reflect the deceased’s intentions because of a clerical error or failure to understand instructions, within section 20 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982. The same evidence justified allowing the issues concerning both the marriage contingency and the meaning of “my estate” to proceed to trial.
4. Validity of the marriage. A voidable marriage is still a marriage for section 18 of the Wills Act 1837, even if later annulled. The test for capacity to marry is relatively low and concerns understanding the nature of the marriage contract and its ordinary responsibilities. Understanding that marriage revokes a will is not ordinarily required, although a person told that fact must be able to understand, retain, use and weigh it.
5. Public policy. The court rejected the proposed general public-policy exception to section 18. The authorities relied on concerned foreign-marriage recognition, an established public-policy rule, or discretionary declaratory relief. They did not authorise the court to refuse to apply a statutory rule which Parliament had not qualified.
6. Orders. The claimant’s application for summary judgment was dismissed. Permission to amend was refused insofar as the amendments alleged that the marriage was void or had no legal effect. The corresponding passages were struck out. The remaining issues, including whether declarations should be made, were left for trial.