Mazepin v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth and Development Affairs

The claimant, a Russian national designated under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, sought interim relief to permit specified activities in the United Kingdom pending a full hearing of his claim under section 38(2) of the Sanctions and Anti‑Money Laundering Act 2018. The principal legal principles applied were the modified American Cyanamid approach in a public law context (the threshold of a serious issue to be tried, adequacy of damages and balance of convenience), and the public interest in the effectiveness of sanctions.

The court assumed for present purposes that at least one ground was seriously arguable but concluded that the balance of convenience and public interest weighed strongly against granting interim relief. Key factors included: (i) the short interim period until the substantive hearing in July; (ii) the claimant’s continuing ability to pursue opportunities outside the United Kingdom (including the European Union where interim relief had already been granted by the EU General Court); (iii) the lack of compelling, specific evidence that UK attendance in the next six weeks would materially change his prospects; (iv) the risk that a UK order would materially undermine the objectives and perceived robustness of the UK sanctions regime and risk circumvention (especially as the sought relief included unspecified financial permissions); and (v) that the claimant was also sanctioned in Canada. The application for interim relief was dismissed.

Background and parties: The claimant, a 24‑year‑old Russian national and former Formula 1 driver under contract with Haas, was designated under the UK Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 following EU and UK measures taken after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The defendant is the Secretary of State responsible for sanctions. The claimant challenged the defendant's decision to take no action on his s.23 request to revoke his designation and sought interim relief permitting specified travel, racing, training and limited financial activity in the United Kingdom pending the substantive hearing.

Nature of the application: This was an application for interim relief under the court's public law jurisdiction (Senior Courts Act 1981 s.37; CPR Part 25) in the context of proceedings under s.38 of the Sanctions and Anti‑Money Laundering Act 2018. The relief sought broadly mirrored interim measures ordered by the President of the EU General Court in separate EU proceedings and included permission to enter the United Kingdom to negotiate with teams and sponsors, to participate in Formula 1 activities, and to open and use a bank account for earnings and related expenses.

Issues framed: The claimant pleaded six grounds in the substantive claim including challenges to: (i) the clarity and lawfulness of the Regulation 6(2)(d) “association” criteria; (ii) breaches of the public sector equality duty (Equality Act 2010 s.149); (iii) ultra vires exercise of powers contrary to the statute's object (Padfield principle); (iv) failure of the Secretary of State personally to decide key decisions; (v) alleged interference with Articles 8 and 1 Protocol 1 ECHR; and (vi) unlawful discrimination contrary to Article 14 ECHR and the Equality Act. For the interim relief application the court concentrated on whether there was a serious issue to be tried and on the balance of convenience in the public law context.

Court’s reasoning: The court applied the adapted American Cyanamid principles for public law cases (drawing on recent authorities). It accepted that at least one ground appeared seriously arguable but did not find a strong prima facie case in the sense necessary to tip the balance. The judge emphasised the short interim period (until the hearing in mid‑July) and asked how much material difference an earlier UK-specific permission would make compared with the position at the substantive hearing. The judge found insufficient, specific evidence that attending in the United Kingdom in the next six weeks would materially improve the claimant’s very limited prospects of securing a 2024 Formula 1 seat. The existence of EU interim relief and the claimant’s continued ability to seek meetings and training outside the UK reduced the weight of his need. The public interest in the effectiveness and perceived robustness of the UK sanctions regime, and the real risk that the interim order sought (in particular unspecified financial permissions) would undermine deterrent objectives and risk circumvention, were held to outweigh the claimant’s prospects. The fact the claimant was also sanctioned in Canada was relevant as part of the factual matrix. On that basis the balance of convenience fell against interim relief and the application was dismissed.

Procedural posture: the full hearing of the substantive s.38 claim was listed for 19–20 July 2023; this judgment disposed only of the interim relief application.

The application for interim relief is dismissed. Although the court proceeded on the assumption that at least one ground of the claimant’s substantive challenge was seriously arguable, the judge concluded that, applying the modified American Cyanamid principles in public law, the balance of convenience and the public interest in maintaining the effectiveness of the UK sanctions regime weighed decisively against granting the short‑term interim relief sought. The judge also relied on the claimant’s access to EU interim relief, the claimant’s continued ability to pursue opportunities outside the UK, the absence of compelling specific evidence that UK entry in the next six weeks would materially alter his prospects, and the risk of undermining and circumventing the sanctions regime (especially regarding unspecified financial permissions).