Mazepin v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth and Development Affairs

Interim relief in a public law claim is governed by the modified American Cyanamid approach. The court asks whether there is a serious issue to be tried, considers the adequacy of damages, and then assesses the balance of justice or relative risk of irremediable prejudice.

In public law proceedings, the court must also consider the public interest in respecting an extant decision until it is set aside. The strength of the challenge may be an important factor, but a strong prima facie case is not a threshold requirement. The relevant period is ordinarily the time until determination of the substantive claim, excluding speculative further appeals.

The claimant sought interim relief pending determination of his claim under section 38(2) of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. He challenged the defendant’s decision to take no action on his request to revoke his designation under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.

The proposed order would have temporarily enabled him to enter the United Kingdom for Formula 1 negotiations and related activities, and to receive and spend money for specified purposes. The substantive claim, raising six grounds of challenge, was listed for hearing on 19 and 20 July 2023. The central issue was whether granting interim relief for the intervening six to nine weeks was just and convenient.

1. The court had jurisdiction to grant interim relief under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, applying CPR Part 25. The applicable approach was the modified American Cyanamid test described in R (Public and Commercial Services Union & Ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 840.

2. The court proceeded on the assumption that at least one ground raised a seriously triable issue. It did not treat the claimant’s case as sufficiently compelling to support the application materially. Damages were not an adequate remedy, so the decisive question was the balance of justice and the relative risk of irremediable prejudice.

3. The relevant period was the period between the interim-relief hearing and the substantive hearing, approximately six weeks. The court was not required to speculate about appeals or further delay after the substantive decision.

4. The claimant’s evidence did not show that refusal of relief would make a highly material difference to his already limited prospects of obtaining a Formula 1 seat. Negotiations could take place in other countries, by video link, or after the substantive hearing. Several requested activities were unlikely to occur before July and could be undertaken elsewhere.

5. Significant weight was due to the public interest in the designation remaining effective until set aside. The sanctions regime formed part of the United Kingdom’s foreign-relations response to the situation in Ukraine. Temporary relaxation risked undermining its deterrent and persuasive objectives, weakening public perceptions of its robustness, and creating opportunities for circumvention, particularly because the proposed financial relief was unspecified.

6. The balance therefore came firmly against the grant of interim relief. The application was dismissed.