X, R (on the application of) v Office for Standards In Education, Children's Services and Skills & Anor

In public-law proceedings, an interim injunction is a matter of broad discretion. The court must assess all circumstances and should not impose a rigid gateway requiring either a strong prima facie case or exceptional circumstances. The merits remain a material factor.

Where an injunction would restrain a public authority’s statutory publication of a regulatory report, the public interest in prompt information for those affected carries very substantial weight. Relief will normally require compelling grounds. A judicial review challenge to an expert inspection cannot be founded merely on disagreement with the weight given to evidence or with evaluative conclusions.

The governing body of a state-funded secondary school sought judicial review of an Ofsted inspection report, made under the Education Act 2005, which graded the school as inadequate. It alleged irrationality and procedural unfairness, and sought an injunction preventing publication pending the claim.

Julian Knowles J refused interim relief in the Administrative Court: [2020] EWHC 69 (Admin). On appeal, the Court of Appeal also sat as a Divisional Court to determine the unresolved application for permission to apply for judicial review. The central issues were whether the claim was arguable and whether publication should be restrained pending its determination.

1. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused and the appeal was dismissed. The school had no arguable case that the inspection report was irrational or that the inspection was procedurally unfair.

2. An allegation of irrationality is particularly difficult where expert inspectors make evaluative judgments within a statutory scheme. Disagreement with the weight attributed to evidence does not establish a public-law error. The report’s favourable findings in some areas and adverse findings on safeguarding, bullying and discriminatory language were not internally inconsistent or perverse. The inspectors were entitled to evaluate the available evidence, including pupils’ concerns, and the later local-authority review did not render the earlier report irrational.

3. The missed meeting with the school’s leadership did not make the procedure unfair. There was no evidence of a general failure to maintain a worthwhile dialogue or of unfair conduct in an inherently fair inspection and complaints process.

4. For interim relief in public law, the court has a broad discretion. The American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 staged approach is not to be applied mechanically. Following the public-law principles in R v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, the court must weigh all circumstances, including merits and the wider public interest.

5. Restraining publication of an Ofsted report requires compelling grounds. The statutory scheme promotes prompt disclosure to parents, pupils and local communities. Reputational harm, possible effects on staffing or admissions, and the risk of intervention did not outweigh that strong public interest. The circumstances were materially different from the exceptional case in R (on the application of the Interim Executive Board of X) v Ofsted [2016] EWHC 2004 (Admin).

6. An interim injunction would not affect eligibility for intervention or the academy order; only an order quashing the report could remove that risk. The judge’s discretionary refusal was neither irrational nor legally erroneous.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2020] EWCA Civ 594, sitting also as a Divisional Court for the permission application, the court refused permission to apply for judicial review and dismissed the appeal against the refusal of interim relief.

• Administrative Court: Julian Knowles J, in [2020] EWHC 69 (Admin), refused an interim injunction restraining publication of the Ofsted report and refused permission to appeal.