Prestwick Care & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In public-law applications for interim relief, the strength of the underlying challenge is a significant factor in the balance of prejudice or risk of injustice, but a strong prima facie case is not a threshold or gateway. The public interest may carry substantial weight, especially where the dispute concerns lawful operation of a licensing regime. On appeal, the court reviews rather than rehearses the discretionary decision. It asks whether the judge was wrong, irrational or plainly incorrect in law; it does not reweigh factors merely because it might have reached a different view. A short humane period to rearrange affairs after lawful revocation may be appropriate, but a delay of months is not ordinarily justified where the affected party has already had ample time to adjust.

The appellant comprised three care-home companies whose sponsor licence was revoked in February 2023. Earlier judicial review proceedings challenging the revocation were dismissed, and the related appeal was dismissed on 11 March 2025. An informal arrangement had kept employees’ leave-to-remain applications on hold while that litigation continued, but the Secretary of State refused to extend it after the appeal failed.

The appellant brought a fourth judicial review challenge, alleging that discontinuation of the arrangement breached the respondent’s policy and was irrational. It sought interim relief preventing decisions on its employees’ applications until permission to bring the claim had been determined. A deputy High Court judge refused relief on 21 March 2025, finding no real prospect of success and that the balance of convenience favoured refusal. The central issue was whether that decision disclosed an arguable appellate error.

Permission to appeal refused.

1. Jurisdiction. Section 16(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 was the starting point and gave the Court of Appeal jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from High Court judgments or orders. The ordinary expectation that a paper refusal of interim relief should first be renewed orally in the High Court concerned practice and discretion, not jurisdiction. The court therefore had jurisdiction, although it left unresolved the detailed effect of CPR rules 3.3 and 23.8 and Practice Direction 23A.
2. Applicable approach. In public-law cases, the underlying strength of the challenge, including whether there is a strong prima facie case, is a significant factor but is not a threshold or gateway. The court balances the risk of prejudice, injustice or justice, rather than convenience in the abstract. On appeal, the question is whether the judge was wrong, not whether the appellate court would have made the same order. Appropriate deference is required for a discretionary decision, and intervention requires irrationality, plain legal error or an identifiable flaw in reasoning that undermines the conclusion.
3. Application. No arguable error was shown. There was a strong public interest in the licensing regime being lawfully, fairly and robustly applied. The licence had been revoked more than two years earlier, and a brief humane period for employees to rearrange their affairs was sufficient; the 14-day period in the informal agreement, and in practical terms the 30 days available by the hearing, were adequate. The prospect of a decision on a new sponsorship licence created no necessary link with the consequences of the earlier lawful revocation.
4. Fresh evidence. The court considered the admission of new evidence under rule 52.21(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, with reference to Ladd v Marshall and Terluk v Berezovsky. The additional witness statement was taken into account de bene esse, but made no material difference. The application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Refused permission to appeal against the refusal of interim relief in the fourth judicial review proceedings: [2025] EWCA Civ 991.
2. Administrative Court, King’s Bench Division A deputy High Court judge refused interim relief by order dated 21 March 2025.