Derby City Council v UYR, R (on the application of)

In age-assessment judicial review, a strong prima facie case is not a separate gateway requirement for interim relief. The merits threshold is whether there is a serious issue to be tried, or a real prospect of success, followed by the usual assessment of damages and the balance of convenience. Because the court determines age as an objective fact, ordinary deference to local authority decision-making does not justify a heightened merits threshold. Where a putative child is already accommodated by another local authority under Children Act 1989, section 20, and that authority cannot simply withdraw support while the age dispute remains unresolved, interim relief against the first authority is unnecessary. The balance of convenience does not resolve inter-authority funding responsibility.

The claimant challenged Derby City Council’s brief age assessment that he was an adult and sought interim relief requiring accommodation and support as a child. The High Court granted relief, applying the three-stage approach in American Cyanamid, and ordered Derby to treat him as a putative child and secure accommodation under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. By then, Manchester City Council had independently accommodated him as a child in foster care under section 20. Derby appealed, raising the alleged strong prima facie case threshold and arguing that Manchester’s existing accommodation removed any need for relief against Derby. The central issues were the applicable merits threshold and whether existing accommodation by another authority altered the balance of convenience.

The appeal was dismissed on ground 1 but allowed on ground 2.

1. Merits threshold. The applicable inquiry for interim relief in this age-assessment judicial review was the three-stage approach derived from American Cyanamid [1975] AC 396: a serious issue to be tried or real prospect of success; adequacy of damages; and the balance of convenience. There was no separate threshold or gateway requirement that the claimant establish a strong prima facie case.
2. The reasoning supporting a higher threshold in De Falco v Crawley BC [1980] QB 460 and Francis v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London BC [2003] 1 WLR 2248 had little application here. The court, rather than the local authority, determines age as an objective fact. Nor did the concern about competing demands on a housing authority’s limited resources apply in the same way, since accommodation must be provided for a child in need irrespective of the number of other children in the authority’s area. The distinction between mandatory and prohibitory relief was not determinative: the underlying inquiry is the likely irremediable prejudice on each side, as explained in National Commercial Bank Jamaica Limited v Olint Corporation Limited [2009] UKPC 16.
3. Existing accommodation. The deputy judge was entitled to conclude that the claimant should be accommodated as a child pending determination of the age dispute. However, she was wrong to treat Manchester’s accommodation as precarious. Manchester had accepted responsibility without reservation, could not simply cease accommodating the claimant while the age issue remained unresolved, and would at least have to undertake its own assessment before changing its position.
4. The authorities supported the possibility that Derby retained responsibility, and that concurrent section 20 duties might arise, but the appeal did not require final determination of that issue. The claimant was already adequately accommodated by Manchester. It was therefore unnecessary to order interim relief against Derby, and the court should not use this application to determine which authority should bear the interim cost.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal on the alleged strong prima facie case threshold, but allowed the appeal concerning the need to order interim relief against Derby.
• High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division: granted interim relief and ordered Derby to treat the claimant as a putative child and secure accommodation, care and support under section 20 of the Children Act 1989: [2025] EWHC 2081 (Admin).