Rupert Lowe MP, R (on the application of) v The Independent Complaints and Grievance Scheme

Interim relief in judicial review is governed by the ordinary serious-question and balance-of-convenience principles, applied with regard to the public interest in allowing a public authority to exercise its powers lawfully.

A claim that Parliamentary privilege may bar final relief does not require the court to determine that issue finally before deciding interim relief. The privilege question may nevertheless be a significant factor in the balance, because incautious relief may interfere with the constitutional relationship between Parliament and the courts.

Where an established parliamentary complaints process is confidential at the investigative stage, speculative reputational harm may carry limited weight. The public interest in allowing the process to continue may be especially weighty where it serves complainants, constituents and the wider public.

The claimant, a Member of Parliament, challenged a decision to proceed with a full investigation under the Independent Complaints and Grievance Scheme into a complaint made against him. The substantive claim alleged perversity, unlawfulness and procedural unfairness.

The Speaker of the House of Commons, defending the proceedings on behalf of the defendant, contended that the activities of the Scheme fell within the exclusive cognisance of the House and that Parliamentary privilege deprived the court of jurisdiction. A preliminary hearing on that issue was listed for 17 March 2026.

Before that hearing, the claimant sought interim relief restraining further investigation. The central issues were whether there was a serious question to be tried despite the privilege argument and where the balance of convenience lay.

1. Application refused. The court refused interim relief restraining the investigation. The preliminary issue hearing on Parliamentary privilege was to proceed on 17 March 2026.
2. Under s. 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court has a broad jurisdiction to grant interim relief. The ordinary approach requires a serious question to be tried, consideration of whether damages would be an adequate remedy, and, if not, assessment of the balance of convenience. The public interest may require particular weight in public law cases, having regard to the prima facie strength of the claim and the gravity of the consequences if relief is refused.
3. The court rejected the submission that a plea of Parliamentary privilege required final determination before interim relief could be considered. The claimant had an arguable case on the novel privilege issue, so there was a serious question to be tried. The assertion that the proceedings fell within the exclusive cognisance of the House was nevertheless relevant to the balance of convenience, since premature relief might interfere with the constitutional balance between Parliament and the courts.
4. The balance required comparison of the hypothetical consequences if relief were refused and the claim later succeeded, with those if relief were granted and the claim later failed. The alleged harm to the claimant was overstated. Investigative responses would be confidential, and any later published findings would be considered in the context of the pending legal challenge.
5. There was a strong public interest in allowing the complaints process, established under resolutions of the House of Commons, to proceed. That interest extended beyond complainants to constituents and the wider public. The balance therefore fell firmly against interim relief, even without relying on Parliamentary privilege.

This was a first-instance application for interim relief in judicial review proceedings. The substantive claim and the preliminary issue concerning Parliamentary privilege remained to be determined.