Dragutin Popovic, R (on the application of) v Ealing Magistrates Court & Ors

Judicial review must be brought promptly, as well as within the long-stop period in CPR r 54.5(1). Filing within three months does not necessarily satisfy promptness. Delay is assessed in the factual and procedural context, and lack of representation, imprisonment or later discovery of legal arguments will not automatically justify an extension.

Judicial review is a remedy of last resort. Where adequate alternative remedies existed and proceedings are brought substantially late, permission may properly be refused. A renewed permission application will fail where the claimant cannot identify an arguable error in the earlier refusal and the claim lacks merit.

The claimant sought permission to bring judicial review proceedings concerning ten decisions arising from his 2019 conviction and sentence for assaulting a County Court officer. The challenged decisions included the conviction, sentence, arrest warrant, refusals to reopen the case, refusals to extend time for an appeal, refusal to state a case, and failures to provide documents.

Permission was refused on the papers by Sir Duncan Ouseley. The claimant renewed the application and challenged the reasoning concerning delay, alternative remedies, jurisdiction, fairness and alleged administrative errors. The central issues were whether the claims were brought promptly, whether any arguable error of law or jurisdiction existed, and whether permission should be granted.

1. Renewed application refused. The court agreed with and adopted Sir Duncan Ouseley’s detailed reasons, subject to minor immaterial corrections. The proceedings were brought far too late and lacked merit.
2. Under CPR r 54.5(1), a claim must be filed promptly and in any event within three months after the grounds first arose. The three-month period is a maximum period, not an automatic entitlement to wait that long. Promptness depends on the facts and context.
3. The claimant’s lack of representation, ten-week imprisonment and alleged late appreciation of possible grounds did not provide a sufficient explanation for the delay. The facts giving rise to the principal challenges were known to him at the time, or shortly after, the conviction and sentence.
4. Judicial review is a remedy of last resort. The claimant had or had had alternative routes, including applications under Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 section 142 and an appeal to the Crown Court. The earlier use of another route did not justify the entire subsequent delay.
5. The challenges to the refusals to extend time for appeal disclosed no arguable error. The adopted reasons included the point that a change in law was not regarded as a good reason for extending time, referring to R v Mitchell. The refusal to state a case therefore also disclosed no arguable basis for review.
6. The complaint about prejudicial material before the judge was unmeritorious. Judges are able to disregard irrelevant material, and there was no basis to doubt that this had occurred. The applications to join the Uxbridge Youth Court, for disclosure and for a protected costs order were also refused. Requiring a financial statement was not a breach of Article 8.

• High Court (Administrative Court) — Sir Duncan Ouseley, sitting as a retired High Court judge, refused permission on the papers on 28 February 2023.
• High Court (Administrative Court) — The renewed application was refused by Mr Justice Julian Knowles on 28 July 2023. The earlier reasons were adopted.