Jaldhi Mideast DMCC v Al Ghurair Resources LLC & Anor

On an application to discharge a committal order, the court may consider all the circumstances and vary the sanction where the contemnor has purged the contempt. The jurisdiction is not, however, an alternative appeal. A party cannot use it to reopen a finding of contempt by relying on evidence that was available at the original hearing. Such a challenge must be made by appeal.

In deciding whether to reduce an unserved prison sentence, the court must make a judgment informed by necessity, proportionality, punishment already undergone, contrition, compliance, the risk of further breach and the interests of justice. A contemnor must demonstrate genuine compliance, or all reasonable steps within his power to achieve it. Holding a formal office or asserting limited authority does not itself establish that no meaningful steps could have been taken.

The claimant obtained a judgment debt against Al Ghurair Resources LLC and later obtained an asset disclosure order. Following non-compliance, Knowles J found the company and its general manager, Essa AbdullaH Ahmad Al Ghurair, in contempt. The company was fined and Mr Al Ghurair was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment.

Mr Al Ghurair applied under CPR 81.10 to discharge the committal order or reduce his sentence. He argued that he lacked authority to cause the company to comply and that the contempt finding should be reopened. The claimant opposed the application, contending that the application could address purging and sanction but not the correctness of the original finding.

1. The finding of contempt could not be reopened. CPR 81.10 preserved the substantive law of contempt and did not provide an alternative route of appeal. Where the challenge relied on evidence available at the original hearing, the appropriate forum was the Court of Appeal. Mr Al Ghurair had needed to attend and raise those arguments before Knowles J. The liberty to apply clause permitted a return to court following belated compliance with the disclosure order, not a reconsideration of the contempt finding.
2. The application was therefore considered as one concerning purging and reduction of sentence. The power to discharge a committal order was not an unfettered discretion. The court had to assess whether the contemnor had received sufficient punishment, whether early discharge served the interests of justice, and the relevant circumstances identified in Swindon Borough Council v Webb and CJ v Flintshire Borough Council. These included proportionality, the interests of upholding the rule of law, genuine contrition, steps taken to prevent further breach, time served and special factors.
3. Mr Al Ghurair had made a sufficient apology by the hearing, but he had served none of the sentence and had not purged his contempt. He had taken no effective steps to obtain or provide information about the company’s assets, or to cause those holding the information to provide it. His limited authority did not prevent him from supplying information within his knowledge and seeking information from banks, family members, officers, employees and auditors.
4. The sentence was not reduced. The court indicated that future evidence showing that Mr Al Ghurair had done his best to provide the necessary information might establish that the contempt had been purged. Any further hearing should be coordinated with the contempt proceedings against the alleged de facto directors.

This was a first-instance application in the Commercial Court. The judgment records the earlier committal decision of Knowles J, but no citation for that decision is provided.