Louis Emovbira Williams v The Federal Government of Nigeria & Anor

Foreign-state service must comply with the exclusive statutory method in section 12(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978, unless the state has agreed another method or has submitted to the jurisdiction. Submission may arise at common law where the defendant takes a step clearly inconsistent with maintaining a jurisdiction challenge. The question is whether the conduct unequivocally conveys acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction, assessed by reference to a disinterested bystander with knowledge of the case. Filing an acknowledgment of service and failing to make a timely jurisdiction application may also amount to statutory submission under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. A state’s failure to comply with the statutory service route does not prevent submission where its subsequent conduct invokes the court’s jurisdiction and seeks to progress the claim.

The claimant brought proceedings against the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Attorney General of the Federation of Nigeria to recover substantial sums allegedly arising from fraud, detention and non-payment under a Nigerian decree. He served the proceedings on Nigeria’s High Commissioner in London rather than through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under section 12(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978. The defendants challenged jurisdiction and denied any agreement to alternative service.

The court considered whether the defendants had submitted to the jurisdiction through requests for further information, an application seeking an order compelling responses, an agreed procedural order, and later evidence addressing the merits. It also considered the procedural effect of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.

1. Outcome. The defendants had submitted to the jurisdiction. Nigeria was therefore precluded by section 12(3) of the State Immunity Act 1978 from objecting to non-compliance with section 12(1). The Attorney General was likewise unable to rely on the absence of permission to serve out of the jurisdiction.
2. At common law, submission requires conduct which is only necessary or useful if the jurisdiction objection has been waived or abandoned. The conduct must clearly and unequivocally convey that the defendant is renouncing the right to challenge jurisdiction. The disinterested-bystander test is useful in assessing that issue.
3. The defendants’ Part 18 request, viewed alone, did not necessarily establish submission. Their subsequent Part 23 application seeking a court order to compel responses so that they could prepare a defence and progress the case towards trial was plainly inconsistent with maintaining that the court lacked jurisdiction. The agreed procedural order further demonstrated that position. Those acts amounted to common-law submission.
4. Alternatively, the evidence supporting the later jurisdiction application engaged with the merits and sought dismissal or strike-out of the claim. That conduct was also inconsistent with an assertion that the court had no jurisdiction. A disclaimer within the evidence did not prevent the court from examining the substance of the acts.
5. Under CPR 10.1(3)(b) and CPR 11(2), a defendant disputing jurisdiction must file an acknowledgment of service indicating that dispute and make the jurisdiction application within the prescribed period. Failure to follow that procedural code amounted to a technical submission in this case.
6. The court rejected the defendants’ arguments based on the CPR 15.11 stay, alleged defects in the response pack, expiry of the claim form and the inability to file an acknowledgment because service was disputed. The court did not determine whether an agreement to alternative service existed, because the finding of submission made that issue unnecessary.