Reading Borough Council v Tina Holland
[2023] EWHC 1902 (Ch)
Case details
Case summary
The appeal concerned a possession order made by the County Court requiring the defendant, Ms Tina Holland, to vacate sheltered accommodation. The central legal questions were whether the landlord had complied with its public sector equality duty (PSED) under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 and whether the possession claim amounted to unlawful disability discrimination under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010. The trial judge found that the tenant had a disability (emotionally unstable personality disorder), that the tenant's breaches of the tenancy arose in consequence of that disability, but that the local authority had complied with its PSED and had shown eviction without suitable alternative accommodation to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
On appeal the court rejected the two principal grounds advanced by the tenant: (i) that the landlord failed to consider, with the required "sharp focus", the specific effect eviction would have on the tenant given her disability (including that further expert evidence was required); and (ii) that the landlord failed adequately to consider all options for suitable alternative accommodation (particularly in Reading) so as to render eviction disproportionate. The appellate court concluded the judge had applied the correct legal tests, had evaluated the evidence properly (including multi‑agency records, medical correspondence and the joint expert report), and was entitled to conclude that the landlord had complied with the PSED and that eviction was proportionate in all the circumstances.
Case abstract
Background and parties: The claimant, Reading Borough Council, sought possession of Flat 24, Liebenrood Road, provided as sheltered accommodation to the defendant/appellant, Ms Tina Holland, an introductory tenant. Ms Holland, aged 62, was diagnosed with emotionally unstable personality disorder (EUPD). The tenancy gave rise to repeated complaints of anti‑social behaviour and repeated interference with the block’s Tunstall emergency communications system. The landlord obtained interim and final injunctions and commenced possession proceedings under the Housing Act 1996.
Procedural history: The trial before HHJ Melissa Clarke took place on 10–11 November 2022. The judge made a reserved judgment on 14 December 2022 and an order for possession on 15 December 2022. The defendant applied for permission to appeal; it was initially refused on the papers but permission was granted on renewal. The appeal was heard in the High Court (Edwin Johnson J) and handed down 24 July 2023.
Issues before the court:
- Whether the council complied with its public sector equality duty (PSED) under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 when it decided to seek possession;
- Whether the tenant’s breaches of the tenancy amounted to something arising in consequence of her disability (section 15(1)(a)), and (not disputed on appeal) whether that causal test was met;
- Whether the council established that eviction without suitable alternative accommodation was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim (section 15(1)(b)), in particular whether less drastic alternatives or suitable accommodation in Reading had been sufficiently considered.
Evidence and factual findings: The judge had detailed evidence including a joint expert psychiatric report from Dr Iles (who concluded the tenant had EUPD and that some conduct was connected to the disability), witness evidence from housing officers and mental health professionals, multi‑agency meeting notes, medical emails expressing concern about eviction, and the tenancy history summarised in a Scott Schedule. The judge found the tenant admitted most breaches and that her behaviour created substantial risk to neighbours and to the functioning of the Tunstall system.
Court’s reasoning and conclusions: The trial judge accepted that some formal equality assessment documents were deficient but held that compliance with the PSED could be demonstrated by the landlord’s broader, continuing, substantive engagement and targeted measures through the tenancy (a “sharp focus” on the tenant’s needs). The judge accepted the joint expert’s finding that the breaches arose in consequence of the disability but concluded, after a balancing exercise, that eviction without alternative suitable accommodation was proportionate because of the real and ongoing risks to neighbours, services and property, and because the council had taken reasonable steps and could not reasonably be required to preserve the tenancy indefinitely while awaiting uncertain accommodation options. On appeal the High Court held the judge had applied the correct legal tests (including the requirement for a focused assessment under PSED and the proportionality approach in section 15) and had been entitled on the evidence to dismiss the PSED and discrimination defences.
Wider context: The court observed the undesirability of eviction of a disabled person into homelessness but stressed that where anti‑social conduct presents serious and ongoing risks and where the council has reasonably sought alternatives and support, eviction can be justified as proportionate. The appeal was dismissed.
Held
Appellate history
Cited cases
- Kannan v Newham LBC, [2019] EWCA Civ 57 neutral
- Paragon Asra Housing Ltd v Neville, [2018] EWCA Civ 1712 neutral
- Aster Communities Ltd (formerly Flourish Homes Ltd) v Akerman-Livingstone, [2015] UKSC 15 neutral
- Barnsley MBC v Norton, [2011] EWCA Civ 834 neutral
- Hotak v Southwark London Borough Council, [2015] UKSC 30 neutral
- Birmingham City Council v Stephenson, [2016] EWCA Civ 1029 neutral
- London & Quadrant Housing Trust v Patrick, [2019] EWHC 1263 (QB) neutral
Legislation cited
- Civil Procedure Rules: Rule 35.1 – CPR 35.1
- Civil Procedure Rules: Rule 35.4 – CPR 35.4
- Equality Act 2010: Section 149
- Equality Act 2010: Section 15
- Equality Act 2010: Section 6
- Housing Act 1985: Schedule 2, Part IV
- Housing Act 1996: Part V, Chapter 1
- Housing Act 1996: section 127(2)
- Housing Act 1996: Section 128