Fit Kitchen Limited & Anor v Relx Group UK Plc & Anor

CPR 7.5 applies to an ordinary Part 8 claim form unless another rule provides a different service procedure or time limit. A claimant must take a relevant service step within four months of issue. After that period, relief under CPR 7.6 requires evidence of all reasonable steps and promptness; alternative service and dispensing with service require the strict conditions in CPR 6.15 and 6.16. A defendant’s conduct amounts to common-law submission only where it is objectively and unequivocally inconsistent with maintaining a jurisdiction challenge. Correspondence raising service defects and a protective application concerning procedure or evidence may prevent such submission.

The defendants applied under CPR Part 11 for a declaration that the court would not exercise jurisdiction because a Part 8 claim form had not been served within four months of issue. The claim form was issued on 3 February 2022. The claimants accepted that no service step had been taken before the email service of 5 July 2022.

The defendants had filed acknowledgments of service, sought directions concerning the use of Part 8 and an extension of time for evidence, and repeatedly raised the alleged failure to serve in time. The claimants argued that CPR 7.5 did not apply to Part 8 claims, alternatively seeking validation of service and contending that the defendants had waived any objection by their conduct. The court also considered an application for a stay or adjournment.

1. Stay refused. The claimants had a full opportunity to participate, had chosen not to attend, and had provided no adequate evidence supporting a stay or adjournment. The overriding objective favoured proceeding with the jurisdiction application.
2. CPR 7.5 applied. Part 7 contains the general provisions governing claim forms. Part 8 modifies those provisions only where it expressly or impliedly does so. CPR 8.2’s signpost to CPR 7.5, the structure of CPR 8.9 and the former PD 8A paragraph 4.1 supported that construction. The absence of an express disapplication meant that the four-month period applied to this ordinary Part 8 claim.
3. The authorities, including Canterbury City Council v Persons Unknown, Grant v Dawn Meats (UK) and Good Law Project Ltd v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, proceeded on that basis unless a specific regime supplied a different time limit. Corus UK Ltd v Erewash Borough Council was confined to cases governed by another rule imposing a specific service period.
4. No relevant service step was taken within four months. The claimants had supplied no evidence of earlier service and had conceded the point.
5. Relief was refused. The strict requirements of CPR 7.6 were not met because there was no evidence that all reasonable steps had been taken and the claimants had not acted promptly. CPR 7.6 controlled any alternative reliance on CPR 3.1 or CPR 3.10. CPR 6.15 was unavailable because no good reason for alternative service was shown. CPR 6.16 was unavailable because there were no exceptional circumstances.
6. There was no statutory waiver under CPR 11. In any event, relief from sanction would have been granted under CPR 3.9 and the Denton v TH White Ltd approach.
7. There was no common-law waiver. Applying the objective, informed-bystander test described in AELF v Surinaamse, the defendants’ conduct was not unequivocally inconsistent with a jurisdiction challenge. Their repeated correspondence questioning service, their procedural application, and the protective request for more time for evidence were capable of being explained by preserving their position.
8. The court declared that it would not exercise any jurisdiction it might have and ordered that the claim form be set aside. The defendants’ names were corrected for misnomer.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.