Re C (Parental alienation: permanent removal to Germany)

In relocation and contact proceedings, parental alienation requires both unjustified resistance or hostility towards one parent and psychological manipulation by the other. The term must be used cautiously. A child’s resistance may be justified by objectively established conduct or circumstances.

Permanent relocation is determined by the child’s welfare as the paramount consideration. There is no presumption that a primary carer’s reasonable relocation proposal will be granted. The court must undertake a comparative welfare assessment of all realistic proposals, giving proper weight to the child’s wishes and feelings and to the parties’ Article 8 rights.

Where further assessment or intervention is speculative, harmful or likely to cause delay, it may be refused. Relocation may promote, rather than breach, the child’s and parents’ family-life rights where it offers the best realistic prospect of preserving or developing relationships.

The father applied for a child arrangements order that C, aged six, live with him or spend time with him. The mother applied for permission permanently to remove C to Germany, where her maternal family lived and where she had employment and schooling arrangements.

The father alleged that the mother had alienated C from him. He alternatively sought C’s removal from the mother’s care or an expert psychological assessment. The local authority and, by the final hearing, the Children’s Guardian supported relocation to Germany with enforceable arrangements for contact. The central issues were whether parental alienation was proved, which proposal best served C’s welfare, and whether further assessment was necessary.

1. Parental alienation. The allegation was not proved. The court adopted the CAFCASS definition, requiring both resistance or hostility that is not justified and psychological manipulation by the other parent. Such manipulation need not be deliberate, but the conduct must be properly characterised as emotionally abusive (paras 51–57). C’s wish to return to Germany was genuine. Her resistance to contact was at least partly justified by objectively established facts, including the father’s past abusive conduct and his role, as C perceived it, in preventing her return to Germany.
2. Interim care order. Since parental alienation was not established, the threshold for an interim care order under section 38(1)(b) of the Children Act 1989 was not met. The court made no finding about whether earlier conduct had amounted to alienation because that issue was unnecessary to determine the applications.
3. Welfare and relocation. The child’s welfare was paramount. The court conducted a comparative evaluation of the three realistic proposals, giving considerable weight to C’s wishes and feelings. Relocation was genuine, realistic and best met her physical, educational and emotional needs. It also offered the best realistic prospect of developing a relationship with the father because it removed the principal source of C’s hostility. There was no presumption in favour of relocation, but the proposal was compelling on the welfare evidence (paras 50, 58–74).
4. Alternative proposals. Removing C from the mother’s care would cause significant harm, with no realistic prospect that it would repair the relationship with the father. A suspended live-with order was unjustified because contact efforts in the jurisdiction were exhausted, failure was not attributable to current parental alienation, and the harm of removal would outweigh any benefit (paras 75–76).
5. Psychological assessment and proportionality. A psychological assessment was not an end in itself. Its possible interventions were speculative, lengthy, costly and potentially harmful. Further delay was not in C’s best interests and was disproportionate under Article 8. The father’s application was dismissed. The mother’s application for permission permanently to relocate C to Frankfurt was allowed, subject to a court order for contact enforceable in Germany (paras 77–84).