Rawle Ganpot & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Where the exercise of immigration-bail powers would leave destitute applicants facing a real risk of breaching their Convention rights, it is strongly arguable that the statutory framework must be applied compatibly with those rights. Interim mandatory relief may be granted where there is a serious issue to be tried and the balance of convenience favours relief. The court need not resolve an issue about whether a strongly arguable case is a threshold requirement for mandatory relief if that standard is met in any event and the case’s strength materially favours the applicant. Administrative burden and public expense may be outweighed by the serious prejudice caused by street homelessness or compelled return.

Three Grenadian nationals sought interim mandatory relief requiring the Secretary of State to provide accommodation pending their judicial review claims. They were destitute, were due to lose temporary local-authority accommodation, and had no apparent alternative accommodation or financial support.

The Secretary of State refused support under Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016, principally because the claimants had not been granted immigration bail and were considered able to return to Grenada. The claimants argued that this approach unlawfully placed them between street homelessness, risking breach of article 3, and return to Grenada, risking breach of article 8 because of the effect on their private-life applications.

The issue was whether interim accommodation should be ordered pending determination of the judicial review claims.

1. Interim relief granted. The Secretary of State was ordered to make accommodation available to the claimants pending the final hearing of their judicial review claims. The hearing was expedited.
2. There was a serious issue to be tried. It was strongly arguable that the Schedule 10 framework under the Immigration Act 2016 had to be read and exercised compatibly with the claimants’ Convention rights. The Secretary of State’s approach arguably forced them to choose between street homelessness in the United Kingdom and return to Grenada.
3. If the claimants remained in the United Kingdom, the evidence indicated that they would become street homeless. In light of their age, medical conditions and the prevailing weather, there was a real risk of a breach of article 3, applying the principle recognised in R (Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66.
4. Return to Grenada also created a real risk of breaching article 8 because it would remove their ability to pursue applications under the private-life route based on 20 years’ residence. The applications were not frivolous or abusive and appeared to have some merit, although their ultimate success remained for the Secretary of State to determine.
5. The applicable interim-relief test was that in American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, modified for public-law cases: whether there was a serious question to be tried and, if so, where the balance of convenience lay. The court did not need to resolve whether a strongly arguable case was a threshold requirement for mandatory relief. Whichever approach applied, the claimants satisfied it or the strength of their case weighed heavily in their favour.
6. The administrative burden and expense of providing accommodation were outweighed by the prejudice and potential human-rights breaches facing the claimants.