Lea Jennings v Otis Limited & Anor

An appellate court should interfere with a case management decision only where it is plainly wrong, in the sense of falling outside the generous ambit within which reasonable decision-makers may disagree. A judge may require a claimant to clarify an inadequately particularised factual case before giving further directions. Where the claimant is the only direct witness, unilateral disclosure of the claimant’s evidence may be ordered without compromising equality of arms or causing realistic prejudice. Applications for permission to appeal case management decisions should also be rigorously assessed by reference to significance, procedural consequences and whether the issue is better determined at trial. The potential value of the claim is relevant, but is not decisive.

The claimant appealed against a case management order made by Master Thornett in an employer-liability personal injury claim. The claimant, an experienced lift engineer, suffered traumatic amputation of his arm in machinery at premises operated by the second defendant. His pleaded case was that he stumbled or lost his balance and that his arm passed through inadequate guarding. The defendants contended that he had deliberately bypassed the guarding.

The Master considered the claimant’s pleadings and Part 18 response insufficiently clear. He ordered a further Part 18 reply and unilateral disclosure of the claimant’s liability evidence before further directions. The central issues were whether the Master had exceeded his case management discretion and whether unilateral disclosure was procedurally impermissible.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Master acted within the discretion afforded to a case management judge by requiring the claimant to clarify the factual mechanism of the accident before directions proceeded. The Part 18 response introduced unspecified possible causes of the stumble or fall and therefore left the defendants unable to understand the full case they had to meet.
2. The claimant should state unequivocally whether he knows what caused the stumble or fall. If he does not know, that should be made clear. The absence of an application by the defendants challenging the Part 18 response did not prevent the Master from requiring clarification where the case was inadequately defined.
3. Unilateral disclosure of the claimant’s witness evidence was permissible and pragmatic. The claimant was the only person in the machinery room and therefore the only direct witness. There was no realistic risk that his statement would influence competing direct evidence from the defendants. The ordinary principle of mutual exchange was consequently displaced, and the order did not deny the parties an equal footing.
4. The applicable appellate restraint was stated by Lord Neuberger in Global Torch Ltd v Apex Global Management (No.2) [2014] 1 WLR 4495: an appellate court should not interfere with a case management decision unless it is plainly wrong, meaning outside the generous ambit in which reasonable decision-makers may disagree.
5. The court also endorsed rigorous application of CPR PD 52A paragraph 4.6. The significance of the issue, the procedural consequences of an appeal and the convenience of determining the issue at or after trial all pointed against pursuing this appeal.
6. The court criticised issuing a Bristol-centred personal injury claim at the Royal Courts of Justice as contrary to the overriding objective where there was no relevant London connection. A case-specific assessment should be made when deciding where to issue. The claim was to be transferred to the Bristol District Registry, with the adjourned CCMC listed before the Designated Civil Judge or nominee.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): Appeal against Master Thornett’s case management order dismissed. The claim was directed to be transferred to the Bristol District Registry and the adjourned CCMC relisted there.