A London Borough v LC & Anor

A deprivation of liberty order cannot be used to authorise conditions which effectively place a child in secure accommodation merely because a placement provider will otherwise terminate the placement. The court must undertake an objective and proportionate assessment of the risks, and must respect the statutory scheme governing secure accommodation under Children Act 1989, section 25. The inherent jurisdiction may fill a genuine gap where a child meets the statutory criteria but no compliant secure placement is available. It cannot expand the statutory cohort or bypass its safeguards where the child does not meet those criteria. A child with capacity cannot be detained on the basis of parental responsibility where the child objects. The application for interim relief was therefore refused.

The Local Authority sought interim authorisation under the inherent jurisdiction for arrangements at an Ofsted-registered residential placement which deprived CC, aged 15, of her liberty. The restrictions included constant supervision, locked doors, accompanied outings, limited internet access and the possible use of reasonable force.

CC’s mother and Guardian opposed the application. The Local Authority relied on alleged risks of child sexual exploitation, absconding, violence and self-harm, and on the placement provider’s stated reluctance to continue accommodating CC without a deprivation of liberty order. The central issue was whether such an order could properly be made where the risks were not objectively established as justifying detention and the placement would otherwise be lost.

1. Interim relief refused. The Local Authority failed to establish an arguable case that the risks to CC’s welfare objectively justified depriving her of liberty. The evidence was inconsistent with the Local Authority’s approach of allowing CC largely unsupervised weekend visits in London, where several alleged risks were said to be greater.
2. The evidence concerning consensual or apparently consensual sexual exchanges did not, without further indicators of coercion, manipulation or deception, establish a high risk of child sexual exploitation. The incidents relied upon were insufficient to justify detention. The evidence concerning absconding, threats of violence and self-harm was likewise inadequate, particularly since CC had not suffered serious harm when absent and the self-harm concerns related to conduct within the placement.
3. CC had capacity to decide whether to accept the arrangements and objected to them. Parental responsibility could not override her decision. The Local Authority was therefore right to seek judicial authorisation, and the arrangements amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of article 5 ECHR: see Storck v Germany [2005] ECHR 406.
4. The statutory safeguards in Children Act 1989, section 25, governed the lawful use of secure accommodation. The placement was not section 25 accommodation. The inherent jurisdiction could be used to fill the gap identified in Re T [2021] UKSC 35; [2022] AC 723, where a child met the statutory criteria but no approved secure accommodation was available. It could not be used where the child did not meet the statutory criteria and no section 25 placement had been sought.
5. A placement provider could not make deprivation of liberty a condition of accepting or continuing to accommodate a child unless objective evidence showed that the statutory conditions were met and the statutory alternatives had been properly considered. The Local Authority also failed to establish that continuation of the restrictions was in CC’s best interests, given the absence of evidence about alternatives and her opposition to the placement.