Invest Bank PSC v Ahmad Mohammed El-Husseini & Ors

A foreign judgment remains capable of recognition and enforcement in England if it is final and conclusive in its jurisdiction of origin. Local legislation or procedural decisions preventing enforcement there do not, without more, create a separate common-law defence. The critical distinction is between non-enforceability and a failure of finality or conclusiveness, such as inherent conditionality or an effective stay pending appeal.

In a set-aside application, a co-defendant directly affected by a default judgment may have standing. However, standing does not remove the need for relief from sanctions or establish a right to relief. The court may refuse to set aside where the underlying default was deliberate, the applicant cannot meet the procedural requirements, any irregularity caused no material prejudice, and setting aside would achieve no practical benefit.

The claimant sought to pursue claims under sections 423 to 425 of the Insolvency Act 1986 against the judgment debtor and alleged transferees of assets. The underlying liability arose from UAE judgments concerning guarantees of corporate credit facilities. After those judgments became unenforceable in Abu Dhabi following the introduction of Article 121 bis of the UAE 2018 Law, the claimant obtained an English default judgment against the primary debtor.

A co-defendant applied to set aside that judgment. The court determined whether the UAE judgments remained final and conclusive, whether the guarantees remained valid under UAE law, whether the default judgment should be set aside, and whether the claimant had capacity to pursue the statutory and equitable claims.

1. Enforceable debt. The UAE Monetary Judgments retained res judicata effect under Abu Dhabi law. Execution-stage decisions did not alter their final and binding status. Article 87 of the UAE Evidence Law No.35 of 2022 supported their status as conclusive proof of the indebtedness.
2. There was no general common-law rule preventing enforcement in England merely because a foreign judgment was not presently enforceable in its country of origin. The relevant common-law requirement was finality and conclusiveness, not local enforceability. Cases concerning inherent conditionality and stays pending appeal did not establish a broader defence. The UAE judgments were therefore capable of recognition and enforcement in England.
3. As a separate and cumulative basis, the guarantees remained valid and enforceable under UAE law. Article 121 bis of the 2018 Law was directed to consumer borrowing and did not cover credit facilities made to limited liability companies, or personal guarantees securing such corporate borrowing. Local judicial circulars could not alter the proper meaning of a federal statute.
4. Set aside application. The co-defendant had sufficient standing under CPR 40.9 because she was a substantive co-defendant whose position was directly affected by the debtor’s liability. The categories of persons able to apply were not closed.
5. Any failure to abandon non-monetary claims when seeking default judgment by request was, at most, a discretionary matter under CPR 13.3. The judgment was not automatically irregular under CPR 13.2. Relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9 was also required. Applying the Denton framework, the debtor’s deliberate and terminal default had no justification, and the co-defendant could not be in a better position.
6. The procedural irregularity was technical and caused no material prejudice. Setting aside would achieve no practical benefit because the debtor’s liability had been established and the claimant had capacity to pursue the statutory and equitable claims. The application was therefore dismissed, although the court indicated that any interest-rate advantage obtained during the relevant period might be disallowed.
7. The statutory capacity issue was answered in the claimant’s favour. The victim issue did not require separate determination on the alternative premise that the debtor was not liable.

First-instance decision. The judgment records an earlier order of HHJ Pelling KC directing the application and preliminary issues to be heard together, but no appellate decision is stated.