Chris White, R (on the application of) v Mayor of London & Anor

Repeated applications for the same interim relief are generally impermissible where earlier applications were dismissed and there has been no material change of circumstances. A claim stayed subject to compliance with a court order is automatically dismissed when the specified steps are not taken within the prescribed period. A proposed reformulation of a ground which is materially different from the original ground is an amendment or substitution, not a mere development. It requires a formal application under the applicable procedural rules and guidance. Where the original claim has already fallen away, and any amendment would be substantially late and prejudicial, permission to amend should not be granted.

The applicant challenged the London-wide expansion of the Ultra-Low Emission Zone and sought permission to pursue judicial-review grounds, together with interim relief. Earlier orders refused some grounds and stayed others pending the decision in related proceedings. The stayed grounds were to be pursued by written submissions within 14 days of the related decision, failing which they would be automatically dismissed.

The related claim was dismissed on 28 July 2023. The applicant did not comply with the April order within time and later sought to pursue a substantially revised ultra vires ground, described as Ground 8. The court had to determine the interim-relief application, the effect of the automatic-dismissal provision, whether Ground 8 was a development or replacement of Ground 1, and whether the proceedings should continue.

Outcome. The application for interim relief was dismissed, and the claim was dismissed.

1. Interim relief. The application was unarguable. Earlier applications for the same relief had been dismissed, there was no material change of circumstances, the charge had already commenced, and the balance of convenience could not support an injunction. The court referred to Chanel v Woolworth and similar authorities.
2. Automatic dismissal. The April order required the applicant, within 14 days after the final decision in the related claim, to state whether Grounds 1 and 5 would be pursued and, if so, to serve written submissions. The applicant did not comply. The later application and amended statement of facts and grounds did not constitute timely submissions. Grounds 1 and 5 were therefore automatically dismissed.
3. Ground 8. Ground 8 was either a development of Ground 1, in which case it fell with Ground 1, or a materially different new ground. The latter was the more likely analysis because the respondents’ original answer could not have addressed it. A new or substituted ground required a formal application to amend. No such application had been made, contrary to Practice Direction 54A, paragraph 11.1, the Administrative Court Guide and the approach identified in AB v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary [2019] EWHC 3461 (Admin).
4. Any application to amend would in any event have had no real prospect of success. It was made after the original claim had fallen away, after the three-month time limit, and after the ULEZ scheme had commenced. Grounds 2, 3 and 4 were no longer pursued and were dismissed. The claim was dismissed.

Not an appeal. The judgment determined the remaining procedural and permission issues in the judicial-review claim at first instance.