Victor Nwosu v Solicitors Regulation Authority Ltd

On an appeal from the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, the appellate court must show considerable deference to an expert tribunal’s factual and evaluative assessments. A decision described in the rules as “wrong” will ordinarily need to be clearly wrong before intervention is justified. The civil standard of proof applies to applications made to the Tribunal after the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2019 came into force. Good character must be taken into account on credibility and propensity, but a formal self-direction is unnecessary if the court can infer that the Tribunal properly considered it. Challenges based on delay require an abuse-of-process application supported by findings on the reasons for delay and prejudice. Appellate review of disciplinary sanctions is similarly restrained.

Victor Nwosu appealed as of right under section 49(1) of the Solicitors Act 1974 against a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal determination dated 25 February 2022. The Tribunal found sexual misconduct proved, imposed a fine of £20,000 and ordered costs of £23,550. The SRA cross-appealed, contending that the sanction was too low.

The appellant challenged the standard of proof, the treatment of his good character, the refusal to hear further oral evidence, the assessment of evidence, delay, costs and sanction. The central issues were whether the Tribunal had erred in law or procedure and whether its sanction was one with which the appellate court could properly interfere.

1. Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed. The Tribunal’s findings of misconduct and its sanction stood.
2. Under Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2019, the relevant application was the application or complaint made by the SRA to the Tribunal on 26 August 2021, not Person A’s earlier complaint to the SRA or the date of the underlying conduct. The civil standard of proof therefore applied. The standards governing sexual misconduct had not materially changed.
3. The court had to show considerable deference to the expert Tribunal’s assessment of evidence. The Tribunal had carefully analysed the evidence and its findings were not open to challenge. Good character was relevant to propensity and credibility, but a formal direction was not essential. It was permissible to infer from the material that the Tribunal had properly considered the appellant’s extensive character evidence.
4. The refusal to permit Mr Okeke to give oral evidence did not constitute procedural unfairness. His statement was before the Tribunal, the application was made during closing submissions, the proposed evidence added little, and counsel had ultimately accepted that the matter should proceed on the indicated basis. Recalling Person A would in any event have been too late.
5. A delay challenge based on abuse of process required an application before the Tribunal and factual findings concerning the reasons for delay and actual prejudice. Neither had been established. The costs order was not materially affected by the failure of one allegation.
6. In sanction appeals, “wrong” meant clearly wrong in context. The appellate court was not to substitute its own view for the Tribunal’s evaluative judgment. The Tribunal had considered culpability, sexual motivation, abuse of power, harm, aggravating factors, mitigation and means. Although the fine was lenient and suspension might have been imposed, it was not clearly wrong.

• Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: On 25 February 2022, found misconduct proved, imposed a £20,000 fine and ordered costs of £23,550.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Dismissed both the appellant’s appeal and the SRA’s cross-appeal.