The London Borough of Richmond on Thames v Alistair Trotman

An interim injunction may be granted where the claim raises a serious issue to be tried, damages or an undertaking in damages would not provide adequate protection, and the balance of convenience favours relief. A vessel may be moored on land for the purposes of mooring byelaws where a gangplank creates a physical attachment between the vessel and the riverbank. A statutory right to navigate and remain stationary on a river is subject to restrictions imposed by applicable byelaws. Where an unlawful mooring causes continuing trespass, environmental damage and interference with other users, it may be just and convenient to restrain the conduct under Senior Courts Act 1981, section 37.

The claimant local authority sought an interim injunction requiring the defendant to remove his vessel, KUPE, from the River Thames near Burnell Avenue and prohibiting further mooring of his vessels on land owned by the authority. The claim was founded on trespass and nuisance.

The defendant did not dispute the essential factual background but argued that KUPE was moored to poles in the riverbed, which he said was controlled by the Environment Agency, and that he had public rights to navigate the Thames and use the towpath. The central issues were whether KUPE was moored on the claimant’s land, whether the mooring breached applicable byelaws, and whether interim injunctive relief was warranted.

1. Interim relief granted. The claimant established a serious issue to be tried in trespass. KUPE had remained effectively stationary for several months and was connected to the riverbank by a makeshift gangplank resting among the trees and roots. That constituted a physical attachment to the claimant’s land and breached Byelaw 4(a), which prohibited mooring for more than one hour in any period of 24 consecutive hours without consent.
2. The defendant’s reliance on a right to navigate the Thames did not defeat the application. Section 79 of the Thames Conservancy Act 1932 conferred rights to pass and repass and to remain stationary for a reasonable period, but expressly made those rights subject to restrictions imposed by byelaws. The relevant navigation byelaws also imposed restrictions concerning mooring and required compliance with the authority’s officers’ directions.
3. An undertaking in damages would not adequately protect the claimant. The defendant was bankrupt, and the continuing mooring was causing damage to trees and vegetation and preventing other river users from mooring lawfully.
4. The balance of convenience favoured relief. There had been no material delay, the claimant had attempted to engage with the defendant before issuing the application, and the ongoing trespass should not be permitted to continue once a serious issue to be tried had been established.
5. It was therefore just and convenient to exercise the discretion under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. An interim injunction was granted with a penal notice. Breach would constitute contempt of court punishable by imprisonment or a fine.