Samira Addou v Sidali Bannabi

Committal proceedings may proceed in the respondent’s absence where the court acts cautiously and ensures that the hearing remains fair and public. The court should consider whether the respondent was served, had sufficient notice, had a reason for non-attendance, understood the consequences, might attend after an adjournment, would suffer procedural disadvantage, and whether delay or proceeding in absence would cause prejudice. Breach of an order in committal proceedings must be proved to the criminal standard. Repeated breaches of orders requiring the return of a child may justify sequestration where less coercive measures have proved ineffective.

The applicant mother sought orders arising from the respondent father’s repeated failure to comply with orders requiring him to return their child, C, from Algeria to England and Wales. Earlier orders had required C’s return, and the father had been found in contempt and sentenced to suspended imprisonment. Further return orders were made, but the father did not comply.

The father had been served with the relevant documents and hearing notices, but did not attend or file evidence. He maintained that jurisdiction lay with the Algerian courts. The court had to decide whether to proceed in his absence, whether the three return orders had been breached, and what order should follow.

1. The hearing proceeded in the father’s absence. Committal proceedings are criminal in nature even though they are not classified as criminal proceedings. The court therefore proceeded cautiously, applying the presumption of innocence and ensuring a fair and public hearing. Applying the principles taken from Sanchez v Pawel Oboz [2015] EWHC 235 (Fam), the court found that the father had been served, had sufficient notice, had chosen not to engage, was indifferent to the consequences, would not attend after an adjournment, and would not suffer material disadvantage. Delay would cause substantial prejudice to the mother, while proceeding would not cause undue prejudice to the process.
2. The breaches were proved. Applying the criminal standard of proof, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that the father had not returned C to England and Wales. He was therefore in breach and contempt of each of the three orders.
3. Sequestration was appropriate. The father had repeatedly breached the return orders and refused to return C. His bank accounts had already been frozen for several months without discernible effect, and the funds were nominal. Sequestration was consequently the proper coercive order.
4. The father retained the right to apply to set aside or vary the sequestration order. Its purpose was to secure his involvement in the proceedings and, if possible, C’s return.

No appellate history is stated. The judgment records earlier procedural orders and a committal decision in the same proceedings.