The Society of Lloyd's v Sally Rosemary Noel

Contempt by breach of a court order requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had notice of the order, committed an act prohibited by it, intended that act, and knew the facts making it a breach. Repeated deliberate breaches, particularly after earlier contempt findings and warnings, may justify imprisonment. The court should distinguish punishment for past contempt from securing future compliance when fixing sentence. A sentence may be suspended where there is a real prospect of future compliance, even though repeated suspension is highly unusual. Serious culpability may be moderated by limited actual harm, remorse, bereavement and mental-health difficulties.

The Society of Lloyd’s applied to commit Sally Rosemary Noel for contempt arising from six alleged breaches of a 2009 order restraining her from publishing adverse references to Lloyd’s and allegations of fraud or dishonesty connected with her former Lloyd’s membership and related matters.

The application was the third contempt application concerning the same order. The alleged breaches involved emails, a letter and material published on a website. The court considered whether the breaches were intentional and knowing, and what sanction was appropriate in light of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

1. Liability. The court applied the criminal standard of proof. Contempt was established where the defendant had notice of the order, performed an act prohibited by it, intended to perform that act, and knew the facts which made the act a breach. Mrs Noel had been personally served, had previously been found in contempt for breaching the same order, and understood that her conduct was prohibited.
2. Each of the six alleged incidents constituted a breach of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the order. The publications referred critically or adversely to Lloyd’s and disseminated allegations of fraud, dishonesty, conspiracy or other criminal conduct within the scope of the injunction.
3. Sanction. The contempts were serious and contumacious. Culpability was aggravated by the repeated nature of the breaches, the previous contempt findings, continued conduct after the application was issued, and earlier promises to comply. Actual harm was limited because there was no evidence that recipients acted to Lloyd’s detriment.
4. The court treated imprisonment as necessary. It assessed six weeks for punishment of past contempt and a further six weeks to secure future compliance, producing an appropriate term of 12 weeks. Remorse, apology, bereavement and accepted evidence of mental-health difficulties justified suspending the sentence, despite the exceptional nature of suspending imprisonment for a second time.
5. The 12-week sentence was suspended for two years. A further contempt during that period would activate the sentence in addition to any sentence for the later contempt.