GPGC Limited v The Government of the Republic of Ghana

Section 12(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978 requires diplomatic service of the document which first asserts the court’s jurisdiction over a state and brings it before the court. It does not ordinarily require diplomatic service of every subsequent interlocutory or enforcement step in the same proceedings. Applications to enforce an arbitral award, including charging-order and receivership applications, are generally further steps in existing enforcement proceedings where the enforcement order has been properly served. CPR rule 6.44 is coterminous with section 12(1). Even if it applied more broadly, alternative service may be authorised under CPR rule 6.15 where there is good reason, including serious delay in diplomatic service and the risk of asset dissipation or diminution.

GPGC obtained an arbitral award against Ghana and secured an order under section 66(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 permitting enforcement as a judgment. The enforcement order was served through diplomatic channels under section 12(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978.

GPGC later sought charging orders over Ghanaian property and a receivership order. Robin Knowles J authorised service of those documents by post and email. Ghana applied to set that order aside, arguing that diplomatic service was required under section 12(1), or alternatively under CPR rule 6.44 unless there was an exceptional reason to depart from it. The central issue was whether the later enforcement applications instituted distinct proceedings against Ghana.

1. The application was refused. The Knowles order permitting alternative service remained in force. The proceedings would continue to determine whether the interim charging orders should be made final and whether a receivership order should be made.
2. Section 12(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978 is directed to the document which institutes proceedings against a state. Its important characteristic is that it marks the point at which the court’s jurisdiction is first asserted and the state is brought before the court. Here, that document was the Cockerill order granting permission to enforce the arbitral award.
3. The charging-order applications and receivership application were further steps in the existing enforcement proceedings. Their jurisdictional basis was the Cockerill order; they bore the same claim number and had no separate existence for limitation purposes. Treating each enforcement step as distinct proceedings would create uncertainty, delay and satellite litigation.
4. This conclusion was supported by General Dynamics United Kingdom Ltd v State of Libya [2021] UKSC 22, L v Y Regional Government of X [2015] EWHC 68 (Comm) and Van Zyl [2017] 4 SLR 849. Those authorities recognised the distinction between instituting proceedings and continuing ongoing enforcement proceedings.
5. CPR rule 6.44 was coterminous with section 12(1). The court accepted the construction in The European Union v The Syrian Arab Republic [2018] EWHC 1712 (Comm). In any event, even if rule 6.44 applied to the later documents, there was good reason under CPR rule 6.15 to authorise alternative service. Diplomatic service would cause serious delay, Regina House was a diminishing asset, and delay in enforcement was inimical to justice.
6. Service by email to appropriate Ministry of Finance contacts was effective, and service by post to Ghana’s High Commission addresses was lawful under Reyes v Al-Malki [2019] UKSC 61. Procedural criticisms of the Knowles application, including the absence of a skeleton argument and the seven-day period for applying to set aside, did not justify setting aside the order.

This was a first-instance application arising in enforcement proceedings. The judgment records that Cockerill J made the enforcement order on 4 November 2021 and Robin Knowles J authorised alternative service on 28 April 2023.