Derbyshire County Council v The Mother & Ors

In fact-finding care proceedings, the local authority bears the burden of proving disputed allegations on the balance of probabilities. The court must assess the whole evidential canvas, draw logical inferences rather than speculate, and avoid treating the absence of an explanation as automatically sinister. Expert evidence assists but does not determine factual responsibility. Where lies are alleged, the court should first establish whether a lie was told, then examine its reason and relevance. A serious injury caused during an argument may justify findings against both parents where the evidence establishes that only they could have caused or understood the event, but does not establish which parent supplied the force. The court may place both in the pool of perpetrators and find that both failed to protect the child.

The local authority brought care proceedings concerning two children after the younger child sustained a life-threatening abdominal injury when a 9cm knife entered her back. The children and mother had been living in Spain, but the English court had previously determined that the children were habitually resident there and that England was the appropriate forum for factual issues.

An earlier fact-finding process was set aside following Y and E, after the Court of Appeal identified procedural and evidential deficiencies. The matter was remitted for a focused hearing of the parents’ evidence. The central issues were how the injury occurred, whether either parent was responsible, and whether both parents had failed to protect the child.

1. Findings and outcome. The court found that the child could not have inflicted the injury accidentally, that the elder child was not present, and that only the parents were in the room at the critical time. One parent had supplied the force which propelled the knife, and the other parent knew, or knew more than was disclosed, about what had occurred. Both parents were found to have lied and to have prioritised their own positions over the children’s interests.
2. The court could not determine which parent propelled the knife. The language of identifying a single perpetrator was unhelpful because both parents might be equally responsible. Both were therefore placed in the pool of perpetrators and both were found to have actively failed to protect the injured child. Their refusal to explain the incident also caused significant emotional harm to both children.
3. The governing principles were distilled at paragraphs 51–60. The local authority retained the burden of proof, and the civil standard applied. The court had to decide each allegation on evidence, while considering each item in the context of the whole evidential canvas. Logical inferences were permissible, but speculation and rumour were not.
4. Expert evidence was advisory. Responsibility for findings remained with the judge, and medical or forensic evidence had to be assessed together with the factual evidence, including the parents’ accounts. The court also had to respect the boundaries of each expert’s expertise and take account of trauma, stress and the fallibility of memory.
5. Applying R v Lucas, the court first had to decide whether the alleged lie was proved, distinguishing deliberate falsehood from mistake, confusion, memory failure or distortion. It then had to consider why the lie was told and whether it was relevant to the ultimate issues. A lie on one issue did not establish that the witness had lied about everything.
6. Further expert evidence was not necessary or proportionate. It was unlikely to identify which parent held or propelled the knife and could not compensate for the parents’ refusal to tell the truth.

The judgment records that an earlier order made by HHJ Williscroft was set aside by the Court of Appeal in Y and E (1996 Hague Convention: Article 11) [2023] EWCA Civ 817. The matter was remitted to Mrs Justice Lieven for a further fact-finding hearing.