Tottenham Hotspur Limited, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Haringey

In a planning judicial review, an officer’s report is unlawful only where it materially misleads the decision-maker on a matter bearing on the decision, such that the decision might have been different without the flawed advice.

A planning authority may secure crowd safety through a combination of planning obligations and conditions. It need not impose absolute obligations where the legal and planning framework provides a workable mechanism requiring responsible parties to negotiate reasonably and enabling the authority to refuse later approvals if arrangements are not workable.

The Agent of Change Principle requires consideration of whether existing businesses will face unreasonable restrictions. It does not require a new development to have no impact or to impose no additional cost.

Tottenham Hotspur Limited sought judicial review of the London Borough of Haringey’s decision to grant planning permission for a major redevelopment adjoining Tottenham Hotspur Stadium.

Permission to proceed was limited to complaints that the Council had failed to assess the totality of the development’s heritage impacts, had unlawfully relied on a Town and Country Planning Act 1990 section 106 agreement and planning conditions to secure crowd safety, and had failed to apply the Agent of Change Principle. The Council and the interested party also argued that relief should be refused or limited if an error were established.

1. Claim dismissed. The Council’s officer’s report and addendum, read fairly and together, assessed the whole development, including elements corresponding to existing permissions. They drew on the Environmental Statement, independent heritage advice and the planning officer’s own assessment. The Council identified the relevant heritage assets, assessed the level of harm and lawfully concluded that the scheme’s public benefits outweighed the less than substantial harm. Ground 1 therefore failed.
2. The statutory duties under the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 had been discharged. The Council’s assessment included the cumulative effect of the existing Goods Yard and Depot permissions. In any event, relief would have been refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, since the decision would have been substantively the same given the significant regeneration benefits and the accepted planning position concerning the extant schemes.
3. The combination of the section 106 agreement and conditions, particularly condition 64, provided a lawful and workable framework for crowd safety. Condition 64 required interim and final crowd flow management plans, consultation with relevant stakeholders and actual access and queuing arrangements capable of implementation. Absolute obligations were unnecessary. The Council was entitled to proceed on the basis that the Claimant and interested party would act reasonably and negotiate access arrangements.
4. The Council was not misled about the nature of the proposed arrangements. Members knew that access would be granted on reasonable terms and that the section 106 mechanism was not absolute. If satisfactory access arrangements were not agreed, the Council could refuse approval because the proposed crowd flow arrangements would not be workable.
5. The Agent of Change Principle was lawfully applied. It required a judgment whether the development would impose unreasonable restrictions on the existing stadium operations, rather than a guarantee of no impact or no additional expense. The Council had sufficient information to reach that judgment and was entitled to conclude that the planning framework would secure satisfactory access without unreasonable impact.

The claim followed refusals of permission on the papers by Lang J and at an oral renewal hearing before Lieven J. Lewis LJ subsequently granted permission to proceed on limited grounds. The present judgment determined the substantive judicial review claim at first instance.