WSP (A Child) (Vaccination: religious objection), Re

Routine vaccination of a child in care is generally in the child’s best interests. A parent seeking to restrain vaccination must provide cogent, objective medical or welfare evidence of a genuine contraindication. Religious objections must be respected and taken into account, but they do not have greater weight because they are strongly held. They are a manifestation of religious belief which may be limited under Article 9(2) where the interference is lawful, necessary and proportionate. The child’s welfare remains paramount. The statutory power of a local authority under Children Act 1989, section 33(3), to override parental objections is compatible with Articles 9, 8 and 14 where adequate safeguards exist and no genuine contraindication is shown.

The mother applied under the inherent jurisdiction for an injunction preventing a local authority from arranging routine vaccinations for her nine-month-old child, who was subject to an interim care order and living in local authority care. She relied on the child’s welfare and on her rights to manifest her Muslim faith under Article 9 of the Convention, together with Article 14. The local authority relied on its power under section 33(3) of the Children Act 1989 to exercise parental responsibility and override her refusal. The central questions were whether the proposed vaccinations were in the child’s best interests, whether the mother had shown a genuine contraindication, and whether vaccination despite her objection was compatible with the Convention.

1. Application dismissed. Vaccination was in WSP’s best interests and was a proper and lawful exercise of the local authority’s parental responsibility under section 33(3)(a) and its power under section 33(3)(b) to override the mother’s objections.
2. Under In Re H (A Child) [2013] Fam 133, the starting point is that routine vaccination is in the best interests of an otherwise healthy child. A parent seeking an injunction must produce cogent, objective medical or welfare evidence demonstrating a genuine contraindication to one or more vaccinations. The local authority need not prove the benefits of vaccination afresh.
3. The mother’s alleged religious and psychological harms were speculative and unsupported by objective evidence. Her religious objection was genuine and had to be respected and given proper weight, but its weight depended on its substance rather than its strength or vehemence. The child’s welfare was paramount, and the objection was inconsistent with it.
4. Refusal of vaccination on religious grounds was a manifestation of religious belief. It could lawfully be regulated under Article 9(2). The statutory framework was foreseeable and accessible, section 33(3) conferred a power rather than an unqualified duty, objective contraindications would prevent its exercise, and the right to apply for an injunction was an important safeguard. Applying the four-stage proportionality test in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury (No 2) [2014] A.C. 700, vaccination pursued the protection of the child and wider public, was rationally connected to that aim, had no equally effective less intrusive alternative, and struck a fair balance.
5. The Article 14 complaint failed. Although children in care and children outside care were treated differently, the distinction had objective and reasonable justification. The statutory distinction between the public and private spheres was proportionate because a care order reflected concerns that the child had suffered, or was likely to suffer, harm in parental care.