Jockey Club Racecourses Limited v Kidby & Ors

Sentencing for civil contempt requires a structured and proportionate assessment of culpability and harm, followed by consideration of mitigation. An early admission should attract a reduction consistent with the Sentencing Council’s guilty-plea guidance. In protest cases, conscientious motivation is not an excuse for breaching a court order, but it may reduce culpability and sentence where the conduct falls within the protection of Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. The court must also consider the totality of sanctions imposed for the same conduct. Custody should be imposed only for the period necessary to reflect the seriousness of the contempt, and suspension may be appropriate where remorse, reflection, undertakings and the prospect of future compliance justify it.

The claimant, which owned Epsom Racecourse, applied to sanction the ninth defendant for admitted contempt of an interim injunction made on 26 May 2023. The order prohibited persons unknown from entering the racetrack except at authorised crossing points and from intentionally obstructing horse races.

The defendant knowingly entered the track during the Epsom Derby and remained there for about 24 seconds. He accepted that his conduct breached the injunction. He had also pleaded guilty to causing a public nuisance under section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, receiving a suspended custodial sentence, unpaid work and costs. The issue before the court was the appropriate sanction for the contempt.

1. Disposition. The defendant was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment, suspended for 18 months, on conditions that he must not enter or remain on any racetrack owned or managed by the claimant and must not intentionally obstruct or disrupt a horse race organised or hosted by it.
2. The court adopted the structured approach summarised in HM Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 and Breen v Esso Petroleum [2022] EWCA Civ 1405. It assessed seriousness by reference to culpability and harm caused, intended or likely to be caused. It then considered whether a fine was sufficient and, if custody was required, imposed the shortest term properly reflecting the seriousness of the contempt.
3. The breach was serious. The defendant knew of the injunction, deliberately disobeyed it, planned his conduct and publicly encouraged others to do likewise. Breach of a court order undermines the administration of justice, the rule of law and the authority of the court.
4. His conscientious motivation did not excuse the breach. However, it reduced culpability in the circumstances. The harm was comparatively limited: no horse or jockey was alleged to have suffered compromised welfare, the defendant was removed swiftly, and contingency arrangements could have stopped the race. His conduct nevertheless created a frightening situation and caused stress.
5. Significant mitigation included the early admission, remorse, apology, undertakings, lack of further disruptive conduct, 36 days already spent in custody and the criminal sentence imposed for the same events. The court took account of the totality of the legal sanctions.
6. The conduct fell within the scope of the protection afforded by Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, but that protection did not displace the need to obey court orders. The defendant’s genuine reflection and undertakings justified suspension. Additional restrictions covering other parts of the racecourse were unnecessary and disproportionate.

First-instance contempt application. The judgment records a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal without permission within 21 days.