Dr Ravish Roy v The General Medical Council

On an appeal from a Medical Practitioners Tribunal, the High Court may receive fresh evidence only if the Ladd v Marshall conditions are satisfied. The evidence must not reasonably have been obtainable for the hearing, must probably have an important influence on the result, and must be apparently credible.

Although an appeal court has full jurisdiction, it should be slow to interfere with primary factual findings based on witness credibility. Credibility must be assessed by reference not only to demeanour, but also to admissions, contemporaneous documents, inherent probabilities, and consistencies and inconsistencies. Fresh evidence that does not materially undermine the evidential basis for the tribunal’s findings should be refused.

Dr Ravish Roy appealed under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 against the Medical Practitioners Tribunal’s decision to erase his name from the medical register. The Tribunal had found proved allegations that, while Ms A was aged between 10 and 15, Dr Roy pursued an improper emotional relationship with her and engaged in sexually motivated and inappropriate conduct.

The appeal relied on a witness statement from Ms B, Ms A’s former school friend, obtained after the Tribunal’s decision. The parties agreed that the court had to decide whether the statement was admissible as fresh evidence and, if so, whether the Tribunal’s assessment of credibility was wrong because it had not considered it.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The court refused to admit Ms B’s statement and upheld the Tribunal’s determination to erase Dr Roy’s name. Dr Roy was ordered to pay the GMC’s costs of £12,000 within 14 days, subject to liberty to apply concerning the method and timing of payment.

2. Under CPR 52.21, the court applied the Ladd v Marshall conditions as restated in General Medical Council v Adeogba. Ms B’s evidence could not reasonably have been obtained earlier and was apparently credible, but it did not probably have an important influence on the result.

3. The Tribunal’s assessment of credibility was not confined to demeanour. It properly tested the competing accounts against admissions, contemporaneous documents, inherent probabilities, and internal and external consistency, consistently with the approach in Suddock v NMC.

4. The Tribunal was entitled to prefer Ms A’s evidence. Dr Roy’s admissions, inconsistent evidence, and extensive contemporaneous emails, poems and messages provided strong corroboration for Ms A’s account and materially undermined his credibility. Ms B had not witnessed the relevant meetings, her evidence was based substantially on what Ms A had told her many years earlier, and parts of her account were contradicted by the contemporaneous material and the established chronology.

5. The court emphasised the restraint appropriate on an appeal from primary findings of fact, particularly findings based on credibility and reliability. Such findings are not jurisdictionally immune from review, but an appellate court should be slow to interfere because the first-instance tribunal has advantages unavailable to the appellate court, as explained in Southall v GMC and Gupta v General Medical Council.

The judgment describes an appeal as of right under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 from the Medical Practitioners Tribunal’s determination dated 21 February 2023. The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Tribunal’s erasure direction.