On The Beach Limited & Ors v Ryanair UK Limited & Anor

Regulation 29 of the Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018 confers a statutory right of redress on an organiser against a third party which contributed to an event triggering compensation, a price reduction or another obligation. The right is not merely preservative of contractual or other existing remedies.

An organiser may also establish unjust enrichment where it refunds travellers for flights in respect of which the carrier offered unconditional refunds. The carrier’s method of access to its website does not necessarily break causation or defeat the claim. Summary judgment may determine points of law where the evidence is sufficient, while factual issues affecting only quantum or particular payments may be left for further determination.

Online travel agents and a related travel portal claimed approximately £2 million from two Ryanair companies. They had refunded travellers whose package holidays were cancelled after Ryanair cancelled or substantially changed flights.

The claim relied principally on regulation 29 of the Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018 and, alternatively, unjust enrichment. Ryanair sought to strike out parts of the Reply and the unjust-enrichment claim, and sought reverse summary judgment. The claimants sought summary judgment on liability. The central issues were whether regulation 29 created an independent right of redress, whether the unjust-enrichment claim was legally sustainable, and whether the pleaded claims could proceed despite disputed matters concerning particular refunds.

1. Applications. Ryanair’s strike-out applications and application for reverse summary judgment were dismissed. The claimants’ application for summary judgment succeeded in principle, subject to the limited issue of refunds paid directly to travellers before the claimants paid them.
2. Summary judgment. The court must distinguish realistic factual disputes from points of law which can properly be decided on the available evidence. It must not conduct a mini-trial, but should decide a short legal or construction issue where the necessary evidence is before it and the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it.
3. Pleading. The claim concerning major changes did not introduce a new cause of action. The essential factual allegations, remedy and underlying bookings remained the same. The claimants’ unjust-enrichment case was sufficiently apparent from the Particulars of Claim, although it would have been preferable to plead its separate bases more clearly.
4. Unjust enrichment. Contractual allocations of risk must be respected. Nevertheless, Ryanair’s terms did not absolutely exclude a traveller’s claim where no flight or compensation was provided. Ryanair’s unconditional offers of refunds, accepted by travellers, created a liability to make those refunds. The claimants’ payment of corresponding sums could therefore support unjust enrichment.
5. Regulation 29. The words “may seek redress” confer a right of redress. The provision is consistent with the consumer-protection purpose and comprehensive structure of the regulations, and with article 22 of Directive (EU) 2015/2302. The right applies against contributing third parties and is not confined to parties in a contractual relationship with the organiser.
6. Causation and quantum. Ryanair’s cancellation or change need not be the sole cause of the event triggering the organiser’s obligations. The flight cancellations contributed to the cancellation of the package holidays. Vouchers did not discharge the liability. Later payments to travellers did not defeat rights which had already arisen, but cash refunds made before the claimants’ payments required further factual determination.
7. Relief. Judgment was entered in principle for £2,056,745.30. The claim concerning £17,929.07 of earlier direct refunds was left to be determined, with leave to defend limited to the amount, if any, recoverable under regulation 29. Declaratory relief was refused because it lacked sufficient utility.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.