Simon Aruchanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department

At the strike-out stage, a negligence claim against a public authority should proceed where the alleged duty is reasonably arguable, even though the claimant faces substantial difficulties at trial. In an omission case, the court may consider whether the authority voluntarily assumed responsibility for confirming a status which it alone had conferred. Foreseeability, proximity, and whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty must be assessed in the statutory and factual context. The threshold is arguability, not proof of the duty or its breach. Closely linked human-rights and data-protection claims may also survive where they stand or fall with the negligence claim.

The claimant sought damages from the Secretary of State for allegedly failing to confirm his refugee status after his status document was lost. He alleged resulting loss of immigration, accommodation and welfare benefits and an exacerbation of post-traumatic stress disorder. He also claimed under the Human Rights Act 1998, relying on Article 8 of the ECHR, and under the Data Protection Acts.

The defendant applied to strike out the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action or being an abuse of process. The central issue was whether it was arguable that the defendant owed a common-law duty of care to confirm the claimant’s refugee status when requested.

1. Negligence claim: The application to strike out was refused. The relevant threshold was whether the alleged duty was arguable, having regard to the possibility of further disclosure and the absence of factual examination at trial.
2. The claim concerned an alleged omission or failure to confer a benefit. Applying the approach in Poole Borough Council v GN and Another, the court could consider whether the defendant had voluntarily assumed responsibility for confirming refugee status which it alone had granted. The available documents arguably showed that the status letter was the claimant’s only proof of lawful leave to remain and that reasonable reliance could be placed upon it.
3. Applying the three-stage approach in Caparo Industries Ltd v Dickman, it was arguable that damage was reasonably foreseeable and that there was sufficient proximity. The fairness, justice and reasonableness limb was more difficult, but was arguable, albeit only just. The absence of evidence from the defendant on that issue was material.
4. The court accepted that the relevant immigration rights and entitlements flowed from leave to remain rather than refugee status itself, and that the claimant might not have had lawful leave after 2001. Those matters, together with the possibility of an application for further leave, were relevant principally to breach and causation. They did not make the alleged duty unarguable at the strike-out stage.
5. The claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Acts were closely linked to the negligence claim and were also allowed to proceed. The proceedings were to be consolidated with the linked unlawful-detention litigation, subject to further submissions on the order.
6. The application for anonymity was refused. The delay in seeking anonymity, the limited practical benefit of anonymity without restrictions on access to documents, and the absence of supporting medical evidence weighed against it. The decision could be reviewed if the factual focus changed.