Ulyana Kukhtyak, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Hounslow

A person has sufficient interest to bring a judicial review where the claimant has a genuine and direct interest in the decision. The existence of another, better-placed challenger does not automatically deprive other directly affected persons of standing.

Under a housing allocation policy, examples of persons who may exceptionally be included in a household are not necessarily exhaustive. The decision-maker must assess whether there is a real need for the person to live in the household to give or receive care or support.

Where a case falls outside the ordinary allocation policy, the authority must separately consider whether it is urgent and complex and should be referred to an exceptions panel. Alternative housing solutions do not remove that obligation.

The claimant, a Ukrainian national, lived with her daughter, grandchildren and seriously ill husband in a two-bedroom council property. The daughter was the registered housing applicant. The defendant refused to include the claimant and her husband on the daughter’s application and refused to refer the matter to its Exceptional Needs Referral Panel.

The claimant challenged those decisions on grounds including lack of standing, irrationality, failure to follow policy, breach of article 8, and failure to make reasonable enquiries. The court first determined whether the claimant had sufficient interest and then considered whether the defendant had properly applied its household and exceptional-needs provisions.

1. Standing. The claimant had sufficient interest under section 31(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The test is interpreted liberally and serves the purposes of judicial review. Several members of a household may be directly affected, and the fact that another person may be better placed to challenge the decision does not create an exclusive standing rule.
2. Household exception. Paragraph 3.3.2 of the defendant’s Housing Allocations Policy required consideration of whether the claimant and her husband had a real need to live as part of the household in order to receive care or support. The examples following the word “may” were illustrative, not exhaustive. The decision was evaluative and could be based on the evidence available when it was made. The defendant had obtained and considered proper medical advice, so this ground failed.
3. Exceptional Needs Referral Panel. Once the defendant concluded that the case fell outside the ordinary allocation policy, it had to ask whether it was urgent and complex. The family’s multiple medical conditions, language and cultural needs, and the husband’s terminal illness provided material evidence of urgency and possible complexity. The availability of alternative housing solutions did not answer that question. The refusal to refer was irrational and failed to follow the policy.
4. Article 8 and enquiries. Article 8 did not confer an absolute right to keep the household together or to secure the husband’s preferred care arrangements. A properly applied allocation policy could proportionately separate households. The request for further information postdated the decisions, and the defendant already had substantial information, so no breach of the Tameside duty of reasonable enquiry was established.
5. The refusal to refer was quashed and declared unlawful. The defendant was ordered to reconsider the matter at the next available Exceptional Needs Referral Panel.

Permission and expedition were granted by May J on 8 September 2023. The substantive judicial review was then heard in the Administrative Court. The judgment describes no appeal from an earlier merits decision.