Solicitors Regulation Authority Limited v Soophia Khan & Ors

A committal application requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent had notice of the order, breached it, and knew the facts constituting the breach. The court may draw conclusions from the totality of circumstantial evidence, although each individual fact need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. A respondent’s silence may support an already compelling case where the circumstances call for an explanation. Where a company is subject to an order, liability may arise from a sole director’s conscious decision not to comply personally or to take reasonable steps to secure the company’s compliance. Orders requiring delivery up of documents and an explanation of compliance serve the statutory purpose of protecting clients and must be complied with promptly.

The Solicitors Regulation Authority applied to commit Soophia Khan, Sophie Khan & Co Limited and Just For Public Limited for contempt of court. The alleged breaches concerned an order made by Miles J under Schedule 1 to the Solicitors Act 1974, requiring delivery up of documents and a signed witness statement explaining compliance steps.

The principal issues were whether the defendants possessed or controlled listed documents when the order was made, whether they knowingly failed to comply with the delivery and explanation requirements, and whether Ms Khan wilfully failed to secure compliance by the two companies.

1. Liability. Ms Khan and the Firm were liable for contempt in failing to deliver the Ledger, Bank Statements and Humpston documents. All three defendants were liable in relation to the Beynon file and Humpston Files 051 and 051-2. Ms Khan was additionally liable for failing to provide the explanations required by paragraph 5 of the Miles Order.
2. For contempt, the SRA had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Khan had notice of the order, acted or failed to act in breach of it, and knew the facts making that conduct a breach. Notice was established by valid service and actual understanding of the order. It was unnecessary to prove that she appreciated the legal character of the breach.
3. The court could draw inferences from the evidence viewed cumulatively. The criminal standard applied to the ultimate inference, but not to every individual fact. The evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that the identified documents remained within the relevant defendants’ possession or control and had not been delivered up.
4. Paragraph 5 was substantive, not a technicality. It required a prompt, truthful account of the steps taken to locate and deliver documents, or the reasons for inability to comply. Its purpose was to enable the SRA and the intervention agent to identify clients, recover documents from third parties and protect client interests under Schedule 1 to the Solicitors Act 1974.
5. Ms Khan’s failure to give evidence was not necessary to the decision. Nevertheless, because the case called for explanations and the evidence was already compelling, the court was entitled to infer that she did not give evidence because it could not exonerate her and cross-examination would damage her case.
6. For corporate liability, Ms Khan had to have wilfully failed to ensure that the Firm and JFP took reasonable steps to comply. The evidence established a conscious decision not to comply herself or to secure compliance by either company.
7. The court therefore found the contempt allegations proved to the criminal standard. Ms Khan remained in breach of paragraph 5 concerning electronic documents and several identified client files.

The judgment states that an earlier committal judgment was appealed and dismissed by the Court of Appeal, but this application was determined at first instance.