The All England Lawn Tennis Club (Championships) Limited & Anor v Broker 4 U Ltd & Anor

Contempt for breach of an injunction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had notice of the order, deliberately performed a prohibited act, and knew the facts making that act a breach. It is unnecessary to prove that the defendant knew the legal character of the conduct as a breach. Where the order permits some dealings but prohibits others, the claimant must prove the defendant’s knowledge of the relevant distinguishing facts. That knowledge may be established by compelling inference from the surrounding evidence. A defendant’s conduct may cause a prohibited transfer even where another person performs the final mechanical step. Hearsay is admissible in civil committal proceedings, although the court must adopt a cautious and flexible approach.

The claimants, who operate the Wimbledon Championships, brought a contempt application against the second defendant. They alleged that he had breached a consent injunction dated 22 August 2016 by offering and arranging the provision of non-transferable Wimbledon tickets for the 2023 women’s final.

The tickets had been obtained through the public ballot and were made available to hotel guests through a concierge service. The second defendant accepted that the injunction was binding but maintained that he had merely introduced the hotel to a third party and believed that the tickets were transferable debenture tickets. The central issues were whether he had performed acts prohibited by the injunction and whether he knew that the tickets were non-transferable.

1. Contempt established. The claimants proved beyond reasonable doubt that the second defendant offered and exposed the tickets for sale, caused their transfer, and provided or arranged for their provision, contrary to the injunction. The formal response of the court concerning sanction and costs was reserved.
2. The applicable requirements were notice of an unambiguous order, a deliberate act prohibited by it, and knowledge of the facts which made the act a breach. The defendant need not know that his conduct amounted legally to contempt or breached the injunction. The prohibited acts themselves could not have been done inadvertently.
3. The distinction between debenture and non-transferable tickets was an essential factual issue. Proof that the tickets were within the injunction did not, by itself, prove the defendant’s knowledge of that fact. However, the court could draw an evidential inference from the proved transaction, while retaining the overall burden of proof on the claimants.
4. The WhatsApp messages showed that the defendant offered the tickets, confirmed the transaction, obtained guest details, and took steps facilitating access to the tickets. His conduct caused the transfer as a matter of fact and degree, even if another person completed the final transfer. The evidence did not establish sale or transfer by the defendant himself to the criminal standard.
5. The court was sure that the defendant knew the tickets were non-transferable. Relevant circumstances included his knowledge of the injunction and ticket trade, the absence of any evidence supporting his asserted belief in debenture tickets, the false James Martin account, the connection with Jim Marks, the block 103 reference, and the absence of any contemporaneous reference to debenture tickets. The conclusion was properly drawn from the whole evidential web.
6. Hearsay was not excluded from civil committal proceedings. It required a flexible and cautious assessment alongside the evidence as a whole. The court also stated, obiter, that proven recklessness or shutting one’s eyes to the obvious might suffice if knowledge of the ticket type were required.

Not stated in the judgment.