Livia Tossici-Bolt & Anor v Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council

A public spaces protection order may restrict conduct that is lawful and peaceful if the statutory threshold for anti-social behaviour is met. The conduct need not be criminal, tortious, violent or seriously anti-social, but trivial annoyance is insufficient. The court applies ordinary judicial review principles, while forming its own judgment where Convention rights are engaged. Qualified rights under Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 have equal value and must be balanced through an intense assessment of necessity and proportionality. A safe zone may include private land on a map, provided the order is properly construed as regulating activities only in public places. Consultation with a named chief officer may lawfully be undertaken through an appropriate subordinate where the statutory context permits delegation.

The claimants challenged a public spaces protection order made by Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council around an abortion clinic in Bournemouth. The order created a weekday safe zone and prohibited abortion-related protest, interference, intimidation, recording, specified displays, certain religious practices and remaining in the zone after being asked to leave.

The first claimant brought a statutory challenge under section 66 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Christian Concern sought judicial review of the Council’s decision, alleging that the order unlawfully affected private land, created an unauthorised dispersal power and was made without proper consultation with the Chief Constable. The central issues were whether the statutory threshold and restrictions were satisfied, whether Convention rights were unjustifiably infringed, and whether the consultation requirement had been met.

1. Disposition. The statutory challenge and the judicial review claim were dismissed. Permission for judicial review was granted on the pleaded grounds, but each ground failed on its merits.
2. Statutory threshold. A PSPO may address conduct that is lawful and peaceful. The conduct need not be criminal, tortious, violent or bordering on violence. “Detrimental” excludes de minimis conduct and trivial annoyance, but otherwise requires an assessment of the actual or likely effect on quality of life. The Council was entitled to assess the totality of the evidence, rather than only the first claimant’s conduct.
3. Restrictions and proportionality. The evidence supported each prohibited activity and its detrimental impact. The Council was entitled to conclude that the restrictions were reasonable under section 59(5) of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 were engaged. The rights of clinic users, their companions and staff could justify restrictions on protestors’ qualified rights. No Convention right had presumptive priority. The order’s prohibition on specified religious practices targeted conduct shown to have occurred, not Christianity or religious people as such.
4. Geographical scope. Although the map included private land, the order, read as a whole, regulated conduct only in public places. Any ambiguity would be construed narrowly because the order restricted individual freedom. The drafting imperfections did not justify quashing it.
5. Dispersal and consultation. Paragraph 4(g) was not a free-standing dispersal power. It operated with paragraph 8 and applied only where a person was believed to have breached the order and was asked to leave by an authorised person. The Council’s consultation duty under section 72(4) was satisfied by communicating with the Chief Constable’s office and receiving a representative response from an appropriate subordinate. Personal consultation by the Chief Constable was unnecessary.
6. Late arguments. Newly advanced legality, Article 8 and discrimination arguments were excluded because they were raised late, without adequate explanation, and caused real prejudice. In any event, the pleaded direct-discrimination case was unarguable.