Hayle Town Council, R (on the application of) v The Cornwall Council

When a new consideration arises after a planning committee has resolved to grant permission, it must be taken into account if it is so obviously material that it was realistically capable of causing a different decision. The authority may nevertheless avoid reconsideration where the delegated officer could not reasonably have discovered or anticipated the matter before issuing the decision notice. A planning officer’s report must be read with reasonable benevolence and as a whole. Where the report establishes that existing highway capacity can accommodate the proposed development, a future infrastructure project may concern later development without being material to the application presently under consideration.

The claimant sought judicial review of Cornwall Council’s grant of planning permission for 85 dwellings at Hayle. Before permission was issued, the Council’s Leader decided that the Council should withdraw from a funded scheme to upgrade the Loggans Moor roundabout on the A30.

The claimant argued that the Leader’s Decision was a new and materially relevant consideration which the Council was required to take into account before issuing the permission. The agreed issues concerned the application of the principles in Kides, the statutory substantial-difference test, and remedy.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Leader’s Decision was a concluded decision made on 8 March 2022. It was not merely an inchoate proposal dependent on the later termination of the funding agreement.
2. The test in Hardcastle was correct. A new consideration is so obviously material that it must be taken into account where it is realistically capable of causing the authority to reach a different conclusion. This is distinct from the further Kides principle concerning matters which the delegated officer could not reasonably have discovered or anticipated.
3. Read as a whole, the officer’s report did not treat the Loggans Moor upgrade as necessary for the present development. The highway evidence showed that existing capacity, including the existing roundabout, could accommodate the traffic generated by the 85 dwellings. The report’s references to the upgrade concerned the longer-term delivery of the Hayle Growth Area. The possibility that future applications might require further infrastructure did not materially affect the present application.
4. The Committee was entitled to be taken to have decided the application for the reasons in the report. Statements made during the meeting did not establish that the Committee relied on a different rationale. Courts should not routinely impute separately expressed views to a planning committee where the minutes identify the report as the reasons for approval.
5. The alternative delegated-officer ground would also have favoured the claimant. Louise Wood issued the permission and had co-authored the report leading to the Leader’s Decision. Had the upgrade been materially relied upon by the Committee, she ought reasonably to have known that fact. The court did not need to determine section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.