Transport for London v Lee & Ors

An interim injunction restraining unlawful protest activity may be continued where the evidence shows a continuing risk of repetition, even if protest activity has reduced or tactics have changed. Breaches of existing injunctions do not, by themselves, justify refusing continuation. The court must assess the usual interim-relief criteria, including serious issue, adequacy of damages, balance of convenience, Convention rights and the effect of section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Expedition is appropriate where the public importance of an early trial outweighs prejudice to other litigants. Persons unknown may be restrained where the class is sufficiently identifiable, and alternative service and third-party disclosure may be ordered where necessary to make the relief effective.

Transport for London sought continuation of an interim injunction against named supporters of Just Stop Oil and persons unknown, restraining specified forms of road-blocking protest on important London roads. It also sought an expedited two-day trial, alternative service, third-party disclosure from the Metropolitan Police, and permission under CPR r31.22 to use disclosed material across related Just Stop Oil and Insulate Britain claims.

The injunction had previously been continued by Freedman J. The claimant relied on continuing protest activity, statements indicating that protests would continue, and evidence of disruption and harm. The central questions were whether the trial should be expedited, whether the injunction should continue pending trial, and whether the ancillary procedural orders should be granted.

1. Expedition. The court ordered an expedited two-day trial. Good reason existed because of the public importance of determining promptly whether a final injunction should be granted and because the defendants faced possible committal proceedings. The interests of other litigants and the absence of prejudice to the participating defendants did not outweigh that need.
2. Continuation of injunction. The court agreed with Freedman J’s reasoning and conclusions. The evidence showed that Just Stop Oil’s campaign had continued, despite reduced frequency and a change from stationary road-blocking to slow marches. Those changes did not eliminate the risk of a return to the conduct restrained by the injunction. Existing breaches were not a reason to refuse continuation, applying South Buckingham DC v Porter.
3. The named defendants had been properly identified. There was a serious issue to be tried under American Cyanamid v Ethicon, including claims in trespass and private and public nuisance. Damages were inadequate because the widespread and unquantifiable disruption could not be prevented or fully compensated.
4. The court conducted the required balancing exercise under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, taking account of DPP v Ziegler and Samede. The injunction struck a fair balance between protesters’ rights and the interests of the community. The court made no determination concerning the separate effect of slow marching on that balance because the claimant did not seek to restrain it.
5. The balance of convenience favoured continuation. The threatened harm was grave, irreparable and widespread, and the injunction was confined to strategically important roads. Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not alter the conclusion.
6. Persons unknown were properly included, applying the approach in Canada Goose v Persons Unknown. Alternative service under CPR rr 6.15 and 6.27 was necessary and effective. Third-party disclosure under CPR r31.17 was justified. Permission under CPR r31.22(1)(b) was granted to use disclosed documents and information across the related claims, in the interests of justice.
7. The interim injunction was extended until trial or further order, and all other applications were granted.

First-instance decision. The judgment records that Freedman J had previously continued the interim injunction in [2022] EWHC 3102 (KB).