Re G (Disclosure of Fact-Finding Judgment to Secretary of State for the Home Department)

Disclosure of a family court fact-finding judgment to the Secretary of State for the Home Department requires the evaluative balancing exercise identified in Re C. There is no presumption in favour of disclosure. The court must assess the child’s welfare, confidentiality, frankness, the public interest in the administration of justice, inter-agency co-operation, the relevance of the material, and any previous disclosure. Disclosure is permissible where it is necessary and proportionate. Confidentiality should not be used to conceal material adverse findings from a public authority with a legitimate interest in them. A parent who has dishonestly advanced a material account cannot rely on the importance of frankness to prevent disclosure. The court ordered immediate disclosure because the findings might bear on asylum status and the competing welfare and Convention-rights considerations did not outweigh the public interest.

The father sought the summary return of his 11-year-old son to country X under the inherent jurisdiction. The application followed a fact-finding hearing in which the court rejected the mother’s allegations of persecution, domestic abuse and serious abuse of the child, and found that she had fabricated material parts of her account of their journey to the United Kingdom.

The mother and child had been granted asylum in the United Kingdom. The court invited the Secretary of State for the Home Department to intervene to determine whether the fact-finding judgment should be disclosed because it might affect their protection status. The central issue was whether disclosure was justified under rule 12.73(1)(b) of the Family Procedure Rules, applying the principles in Re C.

1. Permission and governing approach. The fact-finding judgment fell within rule 12.73(1)(b), so disclosure required permission. The discretion was governed by Re C, as reaffirmed in Re M and P (Disclosure). The court had to identify the relevant competing factors and decide whether disclosure was necessary and proportionate. The exercise was evaluative and fact-sensitive, and created no presumption in favour of disclosure.
2. Welfare and confidentiality. The child’s welfare was carefully considered. Disclosure might cause anxiety and uncertainty, but it could also provide certainty about his status and support the development of a truthful personal narrative. The court could control disclosure so that only material necessary for the Secretary of State’s functions was disclosed. Previous disclosure between the family court and the Secretary of State was also relevant.
3. Frankness and public administration. The importance of encouraging frankness did not protect a parent who had lied about matters relevant to the functions of the family court and another public authority. The court agreed with the approach in R v D and H that family courts should be wary of allowing confidentiality to conceal material adverse findings from a public body with a direct and legitimate interest in them. The guidance in G v G and Re R informed the context but did not displace the Re C balancing exercise.
4. Result. The balance firmly favoured disclosure. Disclosure was necessary and proportionate despite the potential disadvantages to the child and the mother’s rights under articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The father’s solicitors were directed to provide the updated bundle and fact-finding judgment to the Secretary of State. Ongoing disclosure of future orders and evidence was authorised, and the mother and child were given permission to disclose the judgment for advice concerning any asylum-status reconsideration.