Pamela Jane Teasdale v Rebecca Sarah Carter & Anor

On an appeal limited to review, an appellate court must respect the trial judge’s advantage in seeing and hearing witnesses. It may intervene where findings are unsupported, unsafe, or inadequately reasoned, but it must not substitute its own evaluation merely because another view was possible.

Where proprietary estoppel is established in respect of a home built for the claimant, occupied as the claimant’s permanent home, and funded in reliance on a promise of ownership, transfer of the property may be the minimum equity required to do justice. A clean-break payment is not automatically preferable.

The appellant appealed findings and orders made by HHJ Shelton in the Family Court at Leeds concerning Cow House, a property on a farm owned by the appellant and her husband. Their daughter, the first respondent, claimed a beneficial interest based on proprietary estoppel, arising from promises that Cow House would become hers if she funded its conversion and discharged the mortgage.

The first-instance judge found that the promise, reliance and detriment were established, and ordered transfer of Cow House upon discharge of the mortgage. He rejected the daughter’s wider claims concerning the manège, stables and ancillary rights, and made partial costs orders against the appellant.

The appeal challenged the factual findings, the remedy, and the costs orders. It also sought to adduce a later will as fresh evidence.

1. Appeal on factual findings. The appeal was limited to review under rule 30.12 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. The trial judge had heard extensive oral evidence and was able to assess credibility and the overall evidential impression. The appellate court could not interfere merely because another judge might have reached a different conclusion.
2. The trial judge had identified the principal issues, evaluated the evidence, and made findings that were open to him. He was entitled to accept that the daughter and her husband had made substantial contributions to the conversion, that the payments described as rent were in fact connected with the mortgage, and that the appellant knew of and authorised the promise. The failure to determine who placed a listening device did not affect the central issue.
3. The 2018 will was admitted as fresh evidence, but it did not satisfy the requirement that it would probably have an important influence on the result. It did not undermine the findings concerning the building, funding and occupation of Cow House. Ground 1 was dismissed.
4. Remedy. Proprietary estoppel requires the court to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result, with proportionality between the remedy and the detriment. In this case, Cow House had been built for the daughter, she had contributed substantially to its construction and mortgage, and she had occupied it as her permanent home for more than thirteen years. Transfer of the property on discharge of the mortgage was the promised remedy and the minimum equity required to do justice. A compulsory clean-break payment would not be equitable. Ground 2 was dismissed.
5. Costs. The appellant had lost on the central Cow House issue and was properly ordered to pay half the daughter’s costs. The husband was entitled to separate representation because the ancillary litigation affected the financial-remedy proceedings and created potential conflicts. His partial costs order was also within the trial judge’s discretion. The appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

• High Court (Family Division): Appeal from HHJ Shelton in the Family Court at Leeds. Permission to appeal was granted on 8 August 2022. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.