Re C & A (Children: Acquisition and Discharge of Parental Responsibility by an Unmarried Father)

Where an unmarried man acquires parental responsibility by registration as the child’s father, that acquisition rests on a rebuttable presumption that he is the biological father. If paternity is disproved, the foundation of the parental responsibility is displaced. A court order under section 4(2A) of the Children Act 1989 is nevertheless required to bring the parental responsibility to an end. The order reflects the man’s legal status and does not require a welfare analysis. This differs from applications seeking to confer parental responsibility through other statutory routes, where the child’s welfare is relevant.

A local authority brought public law proceedings concerning two children. The mother applied for a declaration that N was not the biological father of C and for consequential directions removing N’s name from the birth certificate and discharging his parental responsibility. N accepted the paternity result but argued that the application should be adjourned for determination at the final hearing, because discharge under section 4(2A) of the Children Act 1989 required a welfare analysis. The central issue was whether disproved paternity automatically ended parental responsibility, or whether a welfare-based court order was required.

1. Application granted. N was ordered to cease to have parental responsibility for C from the date of judgment, and the Registrar was invited to reflect that position on the register.
2. The statutory language distinguishes between a “father” and a “parent”. Section 4 of the Children Act 1989 provides routes by which an unmarried father may acquire parental responsibility, including registration as the father. The biological link is the foundation identifying a man as the father under that statutory regime. Once that foundation is displaced, his status as the father cannot persist.
3. Section 4(2A) nevertheless provides that a person who acquired parental responsibility under section 4(1) ceases to have it only if the court orders. A declaration of non-parentage and subsequent re-registration do not themselves suffice. The court should make clear the date from which parental responsibility has ceased.
4. The order under section 4(2A) does not require a welfare analysis in these circumstances. Welfare analysis is relevant to other routes by which parental responsibility may be conferred, including applications under section 8, but would serve no purpose where the statutory presumption underlying registration has been rebutted.
5. The proposed adjournment was therefore refused. N remained a party and should continue to receive legal advice and representation, but the court would not undertake welfare assessments on the footing advanced by N.