Sally Ann Dignam-Thomas v Paul Alexander McCourt

In a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, reasonable financial provision is assessed objectively. The question is whether the disposition produces an unreasonable result, not whether the deceased acted unreasonably. Testamentary freedom remains important, and the legislation does not correct unfairness or reward good conduct.

The court must consider the statutory factors broadly, including the claimant’s present and foreseeable needs, the needs of beneficiaries, the estate’s size and nature, disability, and the deceased’s obligations. A claimant’s needs are not necessarily the measure of the award. The assessment is made at the hearing and depends on the circumstances of the particular case.

The claimants, adult daughters of Leslie Hooper, applied under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 for financial provision from his estate. The estate principally comprised the deceased’s former home, which had been left to their brother, the second defendant.

The claimants relied on their financial needs, disabilities, care responsibilities and support previously given to the deceased. The second defendant did not effectively participate, although the court was satisfied that he had notice of the proceedings and hearing. The central issues were whether the will made reasonable financial provision and, if not, what orders should be made after considering the statutory factors.

1. Claim succeeded. The court held that the will failed to make reasonable financial provision for both claimants. Awards of £70,000 to the first claimant and £90,000 to the second claimant were ordered, with the balance passing to the second defendant, subject to costs and further submissions.
2. The burden lay on each claimant to establish a failure to make reasonable financial provision and, if so, the appropriate order. Applying Illot v The Blue Cross [2017] UKSC 17, the test was objective. The court had to assess whether the disposition produced an unreasonable result, rather than whether the deceased’s conduct was unreasonable. Testamentary freedom was not displaced merely because the outcome appeared unfair or because the claimants had behaved well.
3. The court treated the statutory assessment as a broad-brush exercise. The two questions—whether reasonable provision had been made and what order should follow—substantially overlapped. The relevant matters were those in section 3, including present and foreseeable needs, the needs of other applicants and beneficiaries, the deceased’s obligations, the estate’s size and nature, disability and other relevant circumstances. Needs were important but were not necessarily the measure of the award, and the assessment was made at the hearing.
4. The claimants’ substantial health, care and financial needs justified provision for maintenance. The second defendant’s non-participation did not mean that he had no competing needs. His income, housing requirement, health circumstances and the deceased’s wish to secure his accommodation remained relevant. The available evidence was sufficient to determine the claims without further delay.
5. The court considered the disproportionate costs incurred in relation to the estate and invited written representations on costs, including whether indemnity costs should be ordered.