Pyrosome Ltd v Secretary of State for Levelling Up Housing and Communities & Anor

Permission for a statutory planning review requires an arguable public-law error. The court will not substitute its own evaluative assessment of a neighbourhood’s character, parking circumstances or development impacts for that of a planning inspector. Minor factual or descriptive disagreements do not establish a material error where the inspector’s central planning judgment remains sound. An unargued point ordinarily cannot found a legal challenge. Where one adverse planning conclusion is plainly fatal, other arguable grounds may lack a realistic prospect of success. The court may also permit correction of an incorrectly used claim form and, in an appropriate case, the accompanying incorrect fee.

Pyrosome Ltd renewed its application for permission to bring a statutory review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Lang J had refused permission on paper, refused an extension of time, and concluded that no arguable error of law had been identified in the Planning Inspector’s decision.

The Inspector had dismissed an appeal against refusal of planning permission for a proposed dwelling and associated works. The renewed application challenged conclusions concerning character and appearance, car parking, affordable housing and a dormer loft conversion. The court reconsidered standing, delay and the merits afresh.

1. Permission refused. The claim had no realistic prospect of success. The claimant had standing because it had a relevant interest in the land, consistent with Eco-Energy (GB) Limited v First Secretary of State [2004] EWCA Civ 1566.
2. The court accepted that the court could permit correction where the wrong claim form had been used, following Croke v SSCLG [2019] EWCA Civ 54. It considered the observations in Hayes v Butters [2021] EWCA Civ 252 concerning an inadvertent court-fee miscalculation to be obiter. The wrong-fee issue was sufficiently controversial that, had the merits required it, a rolled-up hearing would have been directed. It was not a knockout point at the permission stage.
3. The challenge to the Inspector’s assessment of character and appearance amounted to disagreement with evaluative planning judgments. Descriptions of plot size, building lines, proximity to pavements and the area’s character were matters for the Inspector, subject to public-law review. Even the use of the term cul-de-sac was not a material error capable of undermining the substance of the reasoning.
4. The Inspector was entitled to focus on the loss of the host property’s off-street parking space, rather than current parking habits. The transferred parking space remained relevant to the planning assessment, and the conclusion involved an evaluative judgment.
5. The affordable-housing point disclosed no arguable material error. The Inspector had accurately recorded that discussions had occurred, that the proposed unilateral undertaking was for a lower sum, and that no legal agreement had been presented. The dormer argument also failed: the Inspector was entitled to assess the proposal in the round, and the general permitted-development-rights argument had not been advanced before the Inspector.
6. In any event, the unimpeachable character-and-appearance conclusion was plainly fatal to the application. The existing costs order requiring payment of the Secretary of State’s costs, summarily assessed at £5,804.50, was left undisturbed.

• High Court (Planning Court): Lang J refused permission on the papers and refused an extension of time. On renewal, Mr Justice Fordham reconsidered the issues afresh and refused permission.