In the matter of the Child Y

Applications to stay a return order under the 1980 Hague Convention engage a broad discretion, governed by the risk of injustice to the parties. The court should distinguish a short practical stay, intended to preserve a meaningful opportunity to appeal, from a stay pending determination of an appeal. A stay of a Hague return order pending proceedings in the child’s habitual-residence court is exceptional. Where the merits of the appeal cannot fairly be assessed, the central question is whether refusal would stifle the appeal or render it nugatory. The court must also respect the Convention’s policy of expedition and should not defer return indefinitely while foreign proceedings continue.

The mother applied to stay an order requiring the summary return of Y to Romania under the 1980 Hague Convention. The order had been extended for four weeks to allow the Romanian court to determine her application for temporary permission to remain in England with Y. That application was dismissed, and she appealed in Romania. She sought a further stay pending that appeal, relying principally on possible disruption to Y’s schooling, her employment, and the practical consequences of returning before the appeal was decided. Romania was accepted to have primary welfare jurisdiction. The issue was whether the circumstances exceptionally justified further postponement of the return.

1. Application refused. The court refused the further stay and reconfirmed the existing return order.
2. The court had a discretion whether to grant a stay. The essential question was whether granting or refusing it created a risk of injustice. The earlier four-week extension had already provided a short-term opportunity for the mother’s Romanian application to be determined.
3. A short practical stay, designed to prevent an imminent order from unfairly undermining a potential appeal, was distinct from a stay pending determination of an appeal. The latter was governed by the broader stay principles. Under the 1980 Hague Convention, return was required forthwith, and suspension pending steps in the child’s habitual-residence court was available only in exceptional circumstances.
4. Since the court could not assess the merits of the Romanian appeal, it asked whether refusal of a stay would stifle the appeal or render it nugatory. The mother had confirmed that she would continue the appeal from Romania. There was no sufficient evidence that return would prevent the appeal, cause Y to lose his English school place, or require an additional application that would make a successful appeal ineffective.
5. The court also considered the Convention’s policy of expedition, the absence of any listing or reliable timetable for the Romanian appeal, the previous extension, and the benefit to Y of restoring direct contact with his father. These factors did not disclose an exceptional welfare-based reason for a further stay.