Catherine Gedman v Chief Constable of Cheshire Constabulary & Anor

The High Court refused interim relief concerning property seized under a warrant where the alleged unlawfulness of the warrant had not first been established by judicial review. The police may retain seized property under the statutory scheme while necessary for the criminal investigation, subject to its limits. Interim injunctions are governed by the four-stage American Cyanamid v Ethicon test, including serious question to be tried, adequacy of damages and the balance of convenience. Pre-action disclosure concerning a magistrates’ court warrant and its supporting material should be sought through the Criminal Procedure Rules procedure in the magistrates’ court. An application to the High Court for that disclosure, where the prescribed procedure is already in hand, is brought in the wrong forum and may amount to an abuse of process.

The claimant was arrested and property was seized during execution of a warrant at an address in Chester. She had not been charged but remained on police bail. She applied for injunctions requiring the Chief Constable to return property, preserve body-worn-camera footage and remove bail conditions. She later sought disclosure from the Chief Constable and Carlisle Magistrates Court of the warrant and the evidence supporting its issue.

The court considered the statutory and procedural routes for interim relief, challenges to warrant legality, retention of seized property, pre-action disclosure and requests for information from a magistrates’ court. The central issues were whether the claimant could obtain relief before challenging the warrant by judicial review and whether disclosure had been sought in the correct forum.

1. Interim injunctions. The power under s.37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, together with CPR 25, is subject to the four-stage test in American Cyanamid v Ethicon: a serious question to be tried; whether damages would adequately compensate the claimant; whether damages would adequately compensate the defendant under the cross-undertaking; and, if necessary, the balance of convenience. The court should preserve the status quo where the other factors are evenly balanced. [5]-[8]
2. Challenge to the warrant and return of property. The court accepted that, where civil proceedings rely on the alleged unlawfulness of a warrant, the warrant must first be quashed by judicial review before this court can find that the seizure was unlawful. The application for return of the seized property therefore could not succeed on that basis. [9]-[12], [18]-[20]
3. Retention of seized property. Sections 19 and 22 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provide the relevant framework. Property may be retained for so long as necessary in all the circumstances, including for use as evidence or forensic examination, subject to the statutory restrictions, including the sufficiency of a photograph or copy. Nothing before the court showed that the police were acting unlawfully in retaining the remaining items. [13]-[14], [20]
4. Body-worn-camera footage and bail. The Chief Constable was already under a duty under CPR PD 31B to retain footage in view of the intimated civil proceedings. No preservation injunction was necessary, and the claimant no longer pursued that relief. The claimant also accepted that any application to vary bail conditions should be made to the magistrates’ court. [21]-[24]
5. Disclosure of the warrant material. Although s.33(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and CPR 31.16 provide a route for pre-action disclosure, the claimant had not made an application under s.33(2), and her application was unsupported by the evidence required by CPR 31.16(2). In any event, the magistrates’ court was the proper forum for disclosure of the s.8 warrant and related documents under CPR 5.9 and 5.10. The prescribed process was already underway, including a hearing before a District Judge to consider the police objection. The High Court application was therefore brought in the wrong forum and amounted to an abuse of process. [15]-[17], [25]-[33]
6. The January application was dismissed. The March application against both respondents was struck out. The parties were directed to make written submissions on costs and on whether the applications should be declared totally without merit. [34]-[35]