Mary Bevans & Anor v Paul Buckenham

A limited civil restraint order applies to the same proceedings even after the proceedings, or the relevant judgments, are transferred to the High Court for enforcement. A writ of control and its enforcement remain part of the original proceedings. The transfer does not create new proceedings merely because the High Court assigns a separate administrative case number. Where the High Court is provisionally satisfied that permission under the civil restraint order is required, but the judge who made the order is better placed to construe its scope, the High Court may stay the application and make an interim declaration. The applicant must first seek permission from the original judge. The court should avoid determining the substantive application while that question remains provisional.

Mr O’Connor applied to set aside or vary an order made on 16 July 2021 permitting SHCE Ltd and David Asker to use reasonable force to enter premises and seize goods under a writ of control. The writ enforced judgments and orders made by District Judge Humphreys in County Court proceedings E00BQ214, including a limited civil restraint order requiring permission before further applications could be made in those proceedings.

The judgments were transferred to the High Court for enforcement, which generated the separate administrative number EN19/2021. The issue was whether the civil restraint order continued to govern an application concerning enforcement in the High Court.

1. Provisional declaration. The limited civil restraint order applied provisionally to the application. It governed applications in the specified proceedings, and the proceedings remained the same proceedings after transfer of the relevant judgments to the High Court for enforcement.
2. Meaning of proceedings. Obtaining and enforcing a writ of control was still enforcement of orders made in the County Court proceedings. The transfer under CPR 40.14A and CPR 83.19 did not create new proceedings. The High Court case number was merely for administrative convenience.
3. Scope of the restraint order. The requirement to identify affected courts in extended and general civil restraint orders did not apply to a limited order made in a particular set of proceedings. The limited order therefore followed those proceedings when they were transferred for enforcement.
4. Proper judicial forum. Since the order being construed was District Judge Humphreys’ own order, that judge was best placed to clarify its intention and scope. The High Court therefore declined to determine the issue finally and made an interim declaration under CPR 25.1(1)(b).
5. Directions and stay. The application was stayed on condition that Mr O’Connor request permission from District Judge Humphreys within the specified period. It was to be automatically dismissed if the request was not made in time or was refused, with permission to apply concerning costs. The respondents were directed to produce the writ of control and relevant court communication. Mr O’Connor was directed to provide the County Court applications, responses and orders, and evidence explaining the alleged continuation of the stay and the delay in applying.
6. The court made no final determination on the other grounds, including the enforcement agents’ reliance on the 16 July 2021 order and the substantial delay before seeking to set it aside or vary it.

This was a first-instance application in the High Court concerning enforcement of County Court judgments. The relevant judgments and civil restraint order had been made by District Judge Humphreys in County Court proceedings E00BQ214. The judgments were subsequently transferred to the High Court for enforcement, producing the administrative number EN19/2021. The present court stayed the application and left the provisional construction of the restraint order subject to clarification or permission from District Judge Humphreys.