Birmingham City Council v CD & Ors

In care proceedings, disputed allegations must be determined on evidence, applying the balance of probabilities. The court must consider each allegation separately while surveying the whole evidential canvas and avoiding compartmentalisation. Expert opinion assists but does not determine the facts; the judge must combine medical evidence with factual evidence and the parents’ accounts. A failure to provide an explanation is not itself proof of culpability, although it may be weighed with the other evidence. Where lying is alleged, the court should first determine whether a lie has been proved, distinguish lies from mistake or memory failure, consider the reason for the lie, and assess its relevance to the issues. A lie on one matter does not establish that the person lied about everything.

These were care proceedings concerning three boys, X, Y and Z, brought after the death of their 12-week-old half-sister, B. The Local Authority relied on the circumstances of B’s death and injuries, neglectful parenting, and domestic abuse between the parents, CD and FW. The proceedings combined fact-finding with welfare decisions. By the end of the hearing, the welfare outcomes were substantially agreed, but factual findings remained relevant to the parents’ prospects of caring for Z and to FW’s care of other children. The central issues were whether B’s injuries and cocaine exposure were attributable to CD, the extent of CD’s neglect, and the nature and effect of domestic abuse involving FW.

1. Fact-finding principles. The Local Authority bore the burden of proof. The civil standard applied. The court had to determine each allegation on the evidence, while considering the entire evidential canvas and drawing logical inferences where justified. Speculation and rumour could not substitute for proof.
2. Expert and medical evidence. The judge, not the expert, remained responsible for deciding the issues. Medical evidence had to be assessed alongside the factual evidence and the parents’ accounts. The court was required to recognise the developing nature of medical knowledge, keep experts within their expertise, and explain any disagreement with expert conclusions. Recurrence of injury was not probative by itself.
3. Credibility and lies. Applying the approach in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720, the court first had to decide whether an alleged lie was proved on the balance of probabilities. It then had to consider why it was told and whether it was relevant to the issues. Lies could arise from embarrassment, shame, concealment of other wrongdoing, or a mistaken belief that lying would assist. A lie on one issue did not establish dishonesty on every issue.
4. Findings. The court found that CD had persistently prioritised her relationship with FW over the children, had neglected them, had co-slept with B despite warnings, and had consumed sufficient alcohol to be drunk while driving home with the children. On the balance of probabilities, the principal fractures and subdural haemorrhage were inflicted by CD, without a finding of intentional injury. B’s cocaine exposure resulted from CD’s failure to protect her. FW was found to have been the principal physical aggressor in the domestic abuse, to have assaulted G, and to have exposed the children to serious domestic abuse.
5. Orders. Z was made subject to a care order and placed in long-term foster care, with fortnightly contact with each parent and additional remote contact. X was made subject to a care order. Y was made subject to a supervision order while living with SP.